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good that human beings naturally have. I use Thomas Aquinas moral anthropology and 
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1. Zagzebski’s Moral Exemplar Theory 
In Sergio Leone’s classic western, which this essay appropriates its name from, 
there are three characters the film follows: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. All of these 
characters are introduced by a title, but it is only after they have done some act which 
signifies their title is correctly given. What leads to this phenomenon where we can point 
to someone and say, just by looking at their actions, that is a good person? It seems that 
ever since we were young, we were always concerned with heroes and people who do the 
good, we would even consider these heroes and people as “good people.” We find these 
sorts of people in fiction and stories, such as Luke Skywalker, Frodo Baggins, Gandalf, 
Harry Potter, and in (nearly) any comic book. There are great people in history too; 
Abraham Lincoln, Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Mother Teresa, 
Nelson Mandela, Holocaust-rescuers, and of course, many others. In religion, you do not 
have to look far to see many good people such as Jesus, Confucius, Buddha, many of the 
saints that are canonized in the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches, along with 
other holy people that have been part of other religions. 
However, what do all these people have in common? We could paint a broad 






there is a difference between the goodness of Jesus, Abraham Lincoln, and Luke 
Skywalker? What about Buddha and the Holocaust rescuers? We also do not want to 
discredit the goodness of one person or group in comparison to another, as that would be 
disingenuous to our judgment that all of these are good people. 
This is exactly what Dr. Linda Zagzebski deals within her ethical theory known as 
“Exemplarist Moral Theory.” Simply put, this theory claims that through the emotion of 
admiration we detect and thus imitate exemplars of excellency. According to Zagzebski, 
moral exemplars are not just great; they are excellent.1 The saint, sage, and the hero are 
all forms of exemplars according to Zagzebski. What’s even more interesting about her 
theory is that we are more certain about them being admirable than what makes them 
admirable.2 
Zagzebski’s ethical theory is foundational in structure, which means that it is 
constructed out a single point of origin.3 She sees this as an advantage amongst the other 
ethical frameworks, as there is simplicity and elegance, along with a concrete foundation, 
which is the people we admire upon reflection.4 As mentioned earlier, these exemplars 
are identified on the emotion of admiration. The emotion of admiration drives the theory, 
and exemplars are what she calls “the hook.”5 The identity of exemplars is easier to 
conceptualize than any grounded moral theory—the people mentioned above are easier to 
identify than the definitions of happiness, the good life, or moral duty.6 
 
1. Zagzebski, Linda. Exemplarist Moral Theory. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 2. 
2. Ibid, 10. 
3. Ibid, 8-9.  
4. Ibid, 10.  
5. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 8.  






Instead of defining both value and deontic terms and then finding people who fit 
into these definitions, Exemplarist Moral Theory proposes moral terms as indexical. This 
is based on the theory of direct reference developed by Putnam and Kripke, which 
essentially refers to terms by demonstratively explaining things. Moral language is 
defined in reference to paradigmatically good people. This goes past a mere descriptivist 
account, which is beneficial when creating a moral theory. For example, a virtue is “a 
trait we admire in an exemplar. It is a trait that makes a person like that admirable in a 
certain respect.”7  
2. Zagzebski’s Virtue Epistemology 
Zagzebski argues that epistemology and morality have always been intertwined.8 
We can connect this to her moral exemplarist theory, as she develops epistemological 
structures through a virtue-based approach. This will be a different approach to most 
epistemic theories, as they take act-based moral theory as their models. Zagzebski will 
argue for a virtue-based epistemic theory, which will have certain advantages over a 
belief-based theory. These will parallel the advantages that a virtue-based ethical theory 
has over an act-based one.9 Whereas most contemporary epistemological structures use 
either a deontological or consequentialist basis for justifying one’s beliefs, Zagzebski 
focuses on the inner character of the person.10 
 
7. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 21-22.  
8. Zagzebski, Linda, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and 
the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
1-2. 
9. Ibid, 1-2. 






Her virtue epistemology may be able to shed some light on her virtue ethics and 
moral exemplar theory. There are two reasons that this might be useful. First, Zagzebski’s 
main goal in her virtue epistemology is to take Aristotle’s phronesis and turn it into an 
epistemological theory. Aristotle connected the intellectual virtue phronesis to all other 
virtues, and Zagzebski does the same. In current debates about epistemology, there seems 
to be a push that it is not strictly rule-governed, which puts into question the idea of 
Justified True Belief. This can be applied to morality as well, as many moral theorists are 
saying that morality is not necessarily rule-governed either. Using phronesis in both of 
these areas may be able to break free from rule-based epistemology and morality, as 
phronesis gives us insights into particular situations in our experience.  
Second, since admiration is an emotion, it will be important to see how Zagzebski 
defines the concept of emotions. According to Zagzebski, emotions have affective 
components that are supposed to “fit” their object. More importantly, emotions could be a 
reason for doing an action. Many argue that virtue is tied into having the right motives 
and dispositions which justify an action. Zagzebski defines a justified reason for doing an 
act as “the basis of which a rational person can act or believe.”11 If we take this definition 
of reason to be true, then it does not need to hold that certain propositions are true, but 
only that a rational person would use it in supporting a belief. It is not on the basis if 
propositions are true but that a rational person would accept them as justifications for an 
action.  
If we admire someone epistemically, then we must believe that their beliefs are 
true—and how they form beliefs must be the correct way of forming beliefs that we then 
 






act on.12 It is through the emotion of admiration, which has an affective component, that 
can be the basis for one’s beliefs and actions. We will see how her views on emotion and 
phronesis enter into her work, both in her exemplar theory and responding to the 
problems that will be brought up in this paper. 
3. Problems and Solutions 
However, Zagzebski could run into some problems that Aristotle ran into in his 
own virtue ethics. Aristotle defines virtue as a mean between extremes, one of excess and 
the other of deficiency. How one understands this mean relative to themselves is “by 
which a person with practical judgment [phronesis] would determine it.”13 However, it is 
only by the access of a virtuous person or practical judgment can we come to know the 
mean between the extremes. It seems that we would need to seek out a practically wise 
person by already being practically wise. How does one figure out who is a virtuous 
person without this virtue? 
Even though Zagzebski’s understanding of direct reference theory may be able to 
solve this charge normally brought against Aristotle, this raises some potential problems 
in her own ethical theory. For Zagzebski, admiration is not something we choose based 
on coming to know who is admirable, it is something we naturally do. We then develop 
our understanding of morality based on those exemplars we naturally admire. This means 
her theory depends on trusting our faculty of admiration. How does one trust it? Is it a 
reliable guide, despite people and nations who have admired Hitler, Stalin, and Nero?  
 
12. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 147.  
13. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: 






Part of this paper will explore just this issue with Zagzebski’s moral theory. 
Framing this as a more epistemologically charged question, we can ask: Are we able to 
accurately track morally excellent people? How do we guarantee that admiration will 
track moral goodness?  Since admiration is an emotion, it is susceptible to being molded 
by cultural and societal forces. How confident are we in the emotion of admiration? 
Zagzebski claims that there are two ways in which we can respond to things we 
call “good”—either by admiring them or desiring them.14 Since admiration is an emotion, 
she argues that emotions have objects. It is on reflection we see if said emotion “fits” the 
object it is “gravitating towards.”15 However, if our conception of good is skewed 
towards something that is not (such a Hitler being a good person) then our reflective 
judgment will confirm our feeling of admiration. There needs to be a fundamental basis 
which justifies our admiration for virtuous people, while also enabling us to say that 
admiration for vicious people is morally wrong. 
Aristotle argues that emotions have to fit the circumstance in order to hit the 
mean. This presupposes that there is an objective rationale which sets this mean in place 
that we strive to hit. However, he claims that we judge this mean “by which a person with 
practical judgment would determine it.”16 This means that the mean cannot be found a 
priori and must come from finding the virtuous person. According to Zagzebski, it is 
through the emotion of admiration that we detect these practically wise people. However, 
Aristotle would say that since admiration is an emotion there is a vice/deficiency for it 
and that admiration has an appropriate mean. However, to find the mean, we need to find 
 
14. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 30.  
15. Ibid, 32-3. 






the virtuous person and detect them by admiration, thus giving us a problem of epistemic 
circularity. Exemplar moral theory does not solve this problem, but only magnifies it. 
One way to solve the issue is to argue that people have a natural detection for 
goodness. However, it is not just some subjective goodness, but perhaps an objective 
good that is not dependent on one’s personal preference. Saint Thomas Aquinas’s moral 
anthropology suggests that we have a natural orientation to the good. This basic desire 
will hopefully give us a capacity to recognize the good when it appears before us. 
Another person who may help us with this problem is Philippa Foot. She, like Aquinas, 
argues that humanity has a natural desire for goodness and happiness. Although she looks 
at it from a more naturalistic and atheistic framework, she may be able to shed some light 
on this problem as well. I hope that these philosophers’ naturalized virtue theories can 
create a theoretical basis from which we can claim that humans have a natural capacity to 
detect moral goodness when encountered in other people. 
4. A Problem in Christian Ethics 
In her opening chapter of Exemplarist Moral Theory, Zagzebski discusses how 
Christian ethics is a natural candidate for an exemplarist approach because of the 
centrality of Jesus Christ as the moral exemplar in Christian teaching.17 This leads to the 
second problem, which builds off the first one. Within the Christian worldview and 
metaphysics, Jesus Christ is seen as the perfect representation of human goodness and the 
perfect incarnate good. We encounter the perfect incarnate good through narrative 
accounts. Although we may have a natural propensity to admire this perfect goodness 
when we encounter it, do the discrepancies between narrative accounts, both canonical 
 






and apocryphal, make it impossible, or even highly unlikely, for Jesus to be a moral 
exemplar? 
In Bart Ehrman’s book Jesus Before the Gospels, he examines different 
interpretations of Jesus throughout history, specifically how he was remembered when 
the gospels were being written. One of the ways he goes about this is through the idea of 
both individual and collective memory, as he hopes to answer his own question by way of 
understanding how memory works. “When we remember the past, whether we are 
thinking simply our individual thoughts or are reconstructing our previous history as a 
collective whole, as a society, we do so, always and necessarily, in light of our present 
situation. The past is not a fixed entity back there in time.”18 This means that our 
memory, in a way, is malleable and helps us with our present situation. However, he also 
will ask and answer if changing these stories as they were told and retold is necessarily a 
bad thing, as we seem to change stories depending on certain situations and who we are 
telling it to.19 Perhaps it is no different from those who wrote the gospels and their 
apocryphal counterparts. 
Ehrman gives examples of how Jesus is remembered by the earliest Christians, 
whether it be through the apocryphal gospels or the discrepancies of the canonical ones. 
However, this all proves the point to my question; these interpretations and memories are 
vastly different from the peace-loving, kind, gentle, savior of humanity that we are 
presented with today, and they often contradict this portrayal. Perhaps Ehrman will say 
 
18. Ehrman, Bart. Jesus Before the Gospels: How the Earliest Christians 
Remembered, Changed, and Invented their Stories of the Savior (New York, NY: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2016), 7. 






that these different interpretations do not matter, but they certainly make it more difficult 
to imitate an exemplar from a religion that says things like “For to this you have been 
called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, so that you might 
follow his steps.”20 The gospels and epistles are filled with imagery and verses telling us 
to be like Christ; but how are we to do so if we cannot even know who he truly was? I 
hope Ehrman’s conclusion can give us some light on this answer. Perhaps Zagzebski has 
the ability to answer this in her own way, too.  
5. What Do I Want to Gain Out of This Paper? 
My main goal is to answer both of these questions and provide an understanding 
of who we are as people. This paper brings many of my interests together; ethics, 
metaethics, philosophy of religion, and moral education. However, what is the question 
behind the questions of this paper? Quite frankly, I want to understand how people 
become good people. Is there something innate in us that draws us to some eternal good 
that is showcased by exemplars? Is it possible for there to be some objective right and 
wrong that is emulated, commanded, and adhered by the best people throughout history 
and fiction?  
The first question is definitely being driven by the latter question and the more 
fundamental issues it raises. But what drives the second one? I think it would be a bit of 
an overstatement to say that the status of Christian Ethics is at stake, but it certainly could 
be a bit shaken by these questions. Jesus, whether you are a devout Christian, or just 
interested in religion, is a character many people look up too. It is not an understatement 
to say he may be the most impactful person to ever exist. However, for most of history he 
 






has only existed in terms of stories, which were passed down in oral traditions to 
subsequent generations, and now lives in the collective memories of those all over the 
world. Can we truly be like Jesus without fully knowing who he actually was? Is any 
religion where an individual is at the cornerstone able to withstand this scrutiny? I hope 
to come to a firmer foundation on this question, as I believe it will be fundamental to 
Christian ethics that claim we need to be like Christ. How can we be like him if we do not 











ZAGZEBSKI’S MORAL EXEMPLAR THEORY EXEGESIS 
 
1. Introduction 
Dr. Linda Zagzebski has developed a theory that she calls Exemplarist Moral 
Theory. Zagzebski’s “theory of theory” is that moral theories help track moral progress.21 
They also are abstract structures which justify, systematize, and simplify our moral 
beliefs and practices. Theories help us understand the domain of morality as a whole.22 
More importantly, she claims that her theory is foundational in structure, meaning that it 
is constructed out of a single point of origin.23 Like most foundational theories, Moral 
Exemplar Theory has the advantage of simplicity and elegance when compared to other 
moral theories. 
The foundation for Zagzebski’s theory is the people we have admiration for upon 
reflection. Exemplars are identified by the emotion of admiration, as Zagzebski points out 
that it is easier to identify exemplars than conceptualize any grounded moral theory—
Jesus, Socrates, and Confucius are all easier to identify than happiness, the good life, or 
doing one’s duty. In fact, we are more certain about them being admirable than what 
 
21. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 4.  
22. Ibid, 5-7.  






makes them admirable.24 The emotion of admiration drives the theory, while exemplars 
are the “hook.”25  
2. Framework: Theory of Direct Reference 
The framework on which Zagzebski builds her theory is from Hilary Putnam and 
Saul Kripke’s theory of direct reference. The theory of direct reference goes against the 
prior descriptivist accounts in semantics. According to the descriptivist theory, to know 
the meaning of a word is the ability to grasp a descriptive concept that corresponds to the 
meaning given in a dictionary. The user of the term would then designate whatever fits 
the description. A user who grasps the concept does two things: they (a) mentally grasp 
that description of the concept and (b) refer to objects that satisfy the description. When 
people are talking about specific concepts, they are referring to the things in the world 
that fit the description in their head.26 
However, this reference scheme comes into problems with proper nouns, such as 
“water” or “dog.” We can refer to things as a certain kind without going through a 
descriptive basis or meaning. We do not need to define water as H2O because H2O was 
not an essential description of water until recent centuries, yet we do not think the 
discovery of H2O changes the meaning of the word “water.” Instead, direct reference 
theory explains more natural terms, meaning that speakers can refer to whatever is the 
same kind of thing indexically. Water is whatever is the same liquid as that, “dog” is 
whatever is the same species of animals as that.27 
 
24. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 10. 
25. Ibid, 8.  
26. Ibid, 9-10. 






This means that semantic success is not from understanding the descriptive basis, 
but the ability to connect to other speakers in the community who can identify x, while 
also connecting to those who understand x’s deeper features. Using the example of dog 
above, semantic success does not need to be able to grasp the concept of dog in its deeper 
features, such as biological specifics. Instead, one can be able to identify a dog as 
whatever the species of animal like that. One can then connect their concept of dog to 
experts who know what makes a dog a dog.  
An implication for the semantic success of direct reference theory is that meaning 
is determined outside of the mind of the individual speaker. Putnam argued that the 
concepts of our thoughts and speech when talking about natural terms is independently 
determined in two ways: (1) It is determined by the way the world is. An example he uses 
is H2O, and how when we think or talk about “water” we are determined to think about 
H2O because the fact that water is H2O is not an idea of our minds. (2) What we talk 
about also depends upon a linguistic network in which ordinary speakers defer to experts. 
Zagzebski wants to understand how this semantic externalism may be applied and 
defended for moral terms.28 
3. Theory of Direct Reference and Exemplars 
Both Putnam and Kripke applied this theory to linguistics and epistemology, but 
Zagzebski believes the theory has validity in the moral sphere. Much like direct reference 
protects against a form of skepticism of natural kinds, so too does exemplarist ethical 
theory protect against a form of moral skepticism. “What makes somebody good is 
 






having the properties that make that person good.”29 Zagzebski states that when we see 
moral terms such as “good,” “good person,” “virtue,” “duty,” and “good life,” they are 
generally treated with a descriptivist account that Putnam and Kripke both rejected. 
“Moral philosophers have almost always attempted to identify the conceptual content of 
moral terms descriptively, and to identify the referents of the terms by the satisfaction of 
the given descriptions.”30 She cites two problems that arise from this descriptivist 
account: (1) a lack of an agreed-upon definition of a moral term, which leads to disputes 
because certain things do not fit a descriptivist account. (2) A skeptical outlook that stems 
from a lack of an agreed-upon definition. She hopes that using Putnam and Kripke’s 
theory of the semantics of natural kind terms can avoid descriptivist problems in moral 
theory.31 
Instead of giving a descriptivist account of moral terms, Zagzebski proposes that 
these basic moral terms are anchored in exemplars of moral goodness, and then directly 
referenced by people.  
Good persons are persons like that, just as gold is stuff like that. Picking 
out exemplars fixes the reference of the term “good person” without the 
need for descriptive concepts. It is not necessary for ordinary people 
engaged in moral practice to know the nature of good persons—what 
makes them good. In fact, it is not necessary that anybody knows what 
makes a good person good in order to successfully refer to good persons, 
any more than it was necessary that anybody knew what makes water 
water in order to successfully refer to water before the advent of molecular 
theory.32 
 
29. Zagzebski, Linda. Divine Motivation Theory (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 52. 
30. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 14.  
31. Ibid, 14-15.  






Zagzebski argues that there must be a socially recognized ability to pick out “instances of 
a relevant kind.”33 According to her, for moral exemplars, we have a multitude of 
different abilities that are a part of our daily practices, such as telling and retelling 
narratives of moral exemplars. Through narratives, both of fictional and non-fictional 
people, we come to see people who are (and who are not) worth imitating. Zagzebski 
believes that exemplars are these people, the ones that we tell stories about in hopes to 
imitate them. “Exemplars are those persons, the persons who are most imitable or most 
deserving of emulation. They are most imitable because they are most admirable.”34 
Since admiration is an emotion, it might be important to see what she thinks an 
emotion is. Zagzebski’s position is that an emotion is “a state that has both cognitive and 
affective aspects that are not separable states.”35 Affective states are an instance of 
“conscious feeling.”36 “An emotion is a state of feeling in a certain way about something 
or at something or toward something of a certain description.”37 Emotions are conscious 
feeling with intentional objects, and it is this intentionality that separates them from 
moods and feeling. The intentional object of an emotion is what Zagzebski refers to as 
“thick affective concepts.” This is when the agent represents the intentional object of 
their emotions with their emotion. “The thick properties of the situation are properties of 
the intentional object of the feeling, not the cause of the feeling.”38 
 
33. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 15. 
34. Ibid.  
35. Ibid, 59.  
36. Ibid.  
37. Ibid, 60.  






A thick concept is acquired through experiences of having a certain emotion in 
situations in which an intentional object was presented directly to an agent’s 
consciousness. An example of this would be the judgment of something or someone 
being funny or amusing. We associate the emotion of humor and joy with an intentional 
object, such as a comedian, or a movie. Throughout our experience, the judgment of 
something being amusing gets associated with the emotions of joy and humor. The 
primary use of the emotion continues to be derived from the experience of that emotion. 
“On cannot possess a thick concept without being in, or having been in, a state that is 
both cognitive and affective.”39 Affectivity, however, is necessary but not sufficient for 
an emotional state to be motivating. Affectivity is necessary because it is what gets us 
going, but it is what the emotion is directed at that motivates us.40 “There has to be 
something specific in the world around us toward which affect is direct in order for us to 
have anything to which to respond.”41 Zagzebski uses the example of pity. In a state of 
pity, someone is seen as pitiful, and the feeling of pity motivates one to respond to the 
emotion of pity, usually by taking action, such as stopping the suffering which is causing 
the pity.  
Continuing, there seems to be an evaluative aspect of emotions. A judgment such 
as “they are pitiful” is an evaluative judgment expressing the emotional state of pity.42 
According to Zagzebski, when we make these evaluative judgments, we are in an 
intrinsically motivating state. Moreover, this judgment expresses a state that is “both 
 
39. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 64.  
40. Ibid, 71.  
41. Ibid. 






cognitive and motiving in such a way that the two aspects of the state are not detachable.” 
43 “An emotion is good or right or fitting just in case a state of affairs has the thick 
property that the agent sees it as having in the emotional state.”44 An emotion is good in 
the sense that it “fits” its intentional object. 
It is through the emotion of admiration that we can seek out exemplars. According 
to Zagzebski, there are two ways in which we can respond to things we call “good.” We 
can either admire them or desire them.45 Admiration is at the heart of Zagzebski’s theory, 
as she hopes that it can “derive the good in the sense of the desirable from the good in the 
sense of the admirable.”46 Admiration, like all emotions, has objects, which separates 
them from moods and feelings.47 Emotions have objects, and we judge that emotions 
should fit their objects. This means that what (or who) we admire may or may not be 
admirable. Admiration also has an affective component, contrasting it from other 
emotions. Zagzebski believes that admiration is not only affective but motivating as 
well.48 
Zagzebski argues that because of this motivating concept, the person who is 
admiring will want to emulate the person at whom the emotion is directed.49 This applies 
to moral and non-moral categories. Zagzebski cites a study by Johnathan Haidt who 
studied the emotion of admiration from a psychological point of view. However, Haidt 
calls desire to emulate those who do moral acts “elevation.” “For the other-praising 
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emotion, [Haidt] invents the term elevation that he says arises from witnessing the moral 
excellence of others that does not benefit the self.”50 Zagzebski concludes that the 
invented term “elevation” is just another term for what she is describing in her theory of 
admiration. The studies of Haidt and his colleague Algoe indicated  
that both the emotion they call “elevation,” directed at exemplars of moral 
excellence, and the emotion they call “admiration,” directed at exemplars 
of non-moral excellence such as skill and talent, motivate the subject to 
emulate the person at whom the emotion is directed in some way, with the 
difference that admiration for natural talent energizes the people to work 
harder to succeed at their own goals, whereas elevation leads them to 
emulate the moral goals of the other.51 
Although there are some differences between Haidt’s view of elevation and Zagzebski’s 
view of admiration, such as Haidt focusing on moral actions that do not benefit the self, 
such as generosity, charity, etc.,52 Zagzebski finds his study to be pertinent to her theory 
of admiration. 
Next, taking this understanding of admiration, we can start to see how we are supposed to 
respond to admired people. Admiration involves an awareness of a superior good in 
another person.53 Zagzebski claims that the focus of the emotion (admiration) needs to be 
on the person’s possession of the admired good itself, which will allow the admirer to 
feel uplifted, and then want to emulate the admired person. She says that the admired 
person is not a competitor but an “ideal self” in this instance.54  
What is important is just that we do have an ability [to differentiate 
between people to imitate and who not to], and that we have it prior to the 
development of evaluative concepts. I [Zagzebski] surmise that the move 
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from “I want to be like R and not like S” to “R is better than S” is not only 
genetically primitive, but also basic to moral thinking.55 
This imitation is ingrained in us at an early age, we become reflective of whom we want 
to imitate even before we have the ability to make evaluative concepts. 
But who exactly are exemplars? Zagzebski claims that we admire people who 
have developed traits, not necessarily people with inborn talents and skills. We admired 
acquired excellences differently than natural talents and characteristics. Zagzebski 
suggests that “we admire the person for performing admirable acts when we believe that 
the source of the act is something internal to the person’s psychology, and it is acquired 
rather than inborn.”56 What this means is the exemplars cannot be naturally gifted at 
being excellent, but they have to acquire it. This is because, in order for someone to be an 
exemplar, one has to be imitable. Natural talent, although impressive, only inspires us to 
work harder, not to copy or imitate that specific talent. An exemplar and what makes 
them excellent must be able to be achieved by those that admire them. 
Some other stipulations are necessary to be called an exemplar. First, exemplars 
need to have opportunities to be exemplary. Many would agree that without certain 
opportunities the exemplars would not be allowed to rise to moral heights.57 Next, 
exemplars need to be consistently admirable. Zagzebski proposes that  
the root of the idea of a trait of character is in our disposition to 
admiration. We admire persons who have a strong and consistent 
disposition to act admirably more than persons who act admirably 
inconsistently … if most people do not act consistently, it follows that 
most people are not exemplars.58  
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According to Zagzebski, exemplars need to be people who are consistent, and able to rise 
to moral heights in opportunities they are given. More importantly, they need to be 
imitable, so people who admire them can also rise to moral heights when opportunities 
come their way. 
Furthermore, Zagzebski surmises that we do not need to wholly a priori know 
what makes an exemplar worthy of admiration. “The question for exemplarism is 
whether we now in advance of observation that being an admirable person consists in 
having the same deep psychological structure as these exemplars.”59 However, we do not 
need to a priori know “the sameness of admirability. is the sameness of deep 
psychological structure as the exemplars we have identified.”60 Instead, she opts to say 
that the identity of exemplars is determined by our reflexive admiration, our observation 
of them, and finding out what it is that we admire about them.61 
Zagzebski defines exemplars “as those people whom we see, on close observation 
and reflection, to be admirable in all or most of their acquired traits.”62 One of the 
primary ways of transmitting observational data of exemplars is through narratives and 
stories.63 Zagzebski believes that fictional stories of exemplars are just as important and 
beneficial to moral development as historical exemplars. “What exemplars do for us and 
our moral conceptions is largely irrelevant to their actual existence.”64 Other ways in 
which exemplars can be observed is by personal experience and can even make the 
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exemplar more personal to us. This also gives us a personal look at who the exemplar is, 
not just what they are like.65 
4. Exemplars and Moral Terms 
Zagzebski argues that the meaning of “good person” is determined by exemplars 
who are outside the mind. Exemplars, or the admirable persons, are those whom we refer 
directly to through the emotion of admiration and through socially constructed networks 
for linking speakers in a community to exemplars. The meaning of terms related to the 
moral life are determined by characteristics of moral exemplars.66 However, the meaning 
of an exemplar, which is a good person who we admire, can change over time, it is not a 
fixed essence. What exemplars do have in common, though, is that they are admirable.67 
What this means is that there is not a fixed standard that an exemplar needs to conform to 
achieve in order to become an exemplar. Instead, what makes people like Jesus, Socrates, 
Gandhi, and Buddha all exemplars despite living in different times, places, and teaching 
different principles is that they all are admirable.  
Observation leads us to start admiring them, as we admire their behavior and 
characteristics. This admirable behavior needs to endure over time, along with being 
consistent, this is what Zagzebski refers to as a deep disposition in the exemplar’s 
psychology.68 “A good trait of character is a deep and enduring acquired psychological 
disposition that is the source of acts and other behaviors that we find admirable.”69 
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Connecting these two definitions, Zagzebski calls virtue a “deep and enduring acquired 
trait that we admire on reflection and which includes a motive disposition.”70  
According to Zagzebski, exemplars have positive characteristics that they then act 
on, which is what she calls virtues.71 Virtue is an acquired excellence of the person “in a 
deep and lasting sense” through habitual processes.72 Virtue has two components, a 
motivational component, and a success component. A motive is an emotion that initiates 
and guides an action to produce a desired end. “A motivation is best defined, not as a way 
of acting in circumstances specifiable in advance, but in terms of the end at which it aims 
and the emotion that underlies it.”73 Motivations can become essential parts of a person’s 
character that provides them with a certain direction that leads to appropriate actions in 
given circumstances.  
This brings us to the second component regarding virtue, which is a success 
component. The motivational component means that we have an end, whether it be 
internal or external. “A person does not have a virtue unless she is reliable about bringing 
about the end that is the aim of the motivational component of the virtue.”74 Zagzebski 
claims that both of these components can be subjected to the admiration test. She 
connects these to exemplarism by defining a motive disposition as “a component of a 
virtue [that] is a disposition to have an emotion like that of an exemplar and to aim to 
bring about the end the exemplar has.”75 Virtue, then, is an acquired trait that we admire 
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upon reflection, which consists of being able to direct one to a certain end and reliable 
success in reaching that end.76 
5. Emulation and the Good Life 
“Exemplars not only show us what morality is, but they make us want to be 
moral, but they show us how to do it.”77 Moral exemplarism focuses on a guide to moral 
training, both on the outside, such as moral education, and the inside, as we attempt to 
improve ourselves morally. Exemplarism teaches us to be moral by the process of 
imitation.78 “Emulation is a form of imitation in which the emulated person is perceived 
as a model in some respect.”79 We seek our desired self in admired person, which makes 
us want to emulate them. Through the imagination, we can start to take on those roles and 
ideals that exemplars show us, which helps us start to become closer to the ideal.80 “We 
would not be able to see the exemplar as an ideal self without a basic similarity in 
psychic structures between ourselves and the exemplar.”81 
One of the goods that Zagzebski describes in Divine Motivation Theory is Rawls’s 
idea of the good for human beings. Exemplars, who are paradigmatically good people 
that we want to emulate, have certain motives which connect to the things that are good 
for us. These can be certain emotions, health, knowledge, friendships, peaceful 
communities, etc. However, just because something is good does not explain why it is 
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good. “If something can be good for an x and not for a y, there must be different 
standards for x’s and y’s, and that standard needs to be specified.”82  
Zagzebski argues that this “standard” is inherited from the Greek conception of 
the telos, which she defines as “a form of good that is more basic than its means or 
constituents. A telos is a final end.”83 If the standard is a telos, then to say that something 
is good for us is either as a means of achieving the telos or as a requirement for the telos. 
However, according to Zagzebski, a telos cannot be the intrinsic good, as final ends 
cannot be the most basic form of the good. “The telos must be related to intrinsically 
good motivational states that have telos as their end. What is good for us in this sense is 
extrinsic.”84 
Zagzebski connects the idea of “what is good for us” to the exemplary good 
person. “What is good for us…be derived from an exemplar of goodness.”85 She says that 
the good person can serve as a “standard of perfection against which the rest of us are 
measured.”86 What is good for us is to emulate the exemplar. This then connects to the 
Aristotelian idea of eudemonia, or human flourishing, which many virtue ethics say is 
what is intrinsically good for us. Instead, Zagzebski defines human flourishing as living 
the kind of life the exemplar desires or aims.87 
Another central claim in Zagzebski’s exemplar theory is Aristotle’s understanding 
of the virtue known as phronesis or practical wisdom. Aristotle connects phronesis to the 
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moral virtues. Aristotle claimed that one cannot have the moral virtues without phronesis, 
and that one who has it has the moral virtues.88 Moreover, Aristotle contends that 
phronesis is a social operation, both in the manner of acquisition and operation. As we 
have seen, virtue is learned by imitation. We imitate those in the community that are 
practically wise.89 
Interestingly enough, Zagzebski's virtue ethics differentiate between acts such as 
one who has a good will and acts from a good will.  
An act has a form of value when it is the type of act a virtuous person 
would do, but it is even better if it is produced in the same way that a 
virtuous person produced it, that is, with a virtuous motive.90  
It seems that we must not only do actions that exemplars do, but also create in us similar 
dispositions and wants of ends. This is done by phronesis, which deliberates between 
good ends and motives and how to fulfill those ends. If we strive to emulate an exemplar, 
we need to systematically understand how they see/saw the world. 
Zagzebski also argues that we want to have models of good lives, both for 
practical and theoretical reasons. In terms of practicality,  
we want to have an idea of the kind of life to which we can aspire, and the 
kinds of lives worthy of being the goal of people to whom we are 
connected by family or community, or whose lives are affected by our 
financial choices and our choice of political leaders.91  
In terms of a theoretical desire, Zagzebski raises the question “what is the connection 
between a good life in the sense of an admirable life or a life of virtue, and a good life in 
the sense of a desirable life, or a life of happiness or flourishing?”92 Moral Exemplar 
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Theory’s answer to this, of course, is that “a desirable life is one that a good person 
would desire.” But what is a desirable life? Using the theory of direct reference, we can 
see that it is a life desire by persons like that.93 
6. Conclusion 
Zagzebski’s Moral Exemplar Theory is a virtue theory that supposes we seek out 
exemplars and imitate them. Using the theory of direct reference as her framework, 
Zagzebski is able to build a theory in which we define moral terms by admirable people. 
“In exemplarism, I have proposed that we have initial referential intentions applied to 
indexically identified objects—admirable persons or persons like that.”94 Indexically 
identifying exemplars is through the emotion of admiration, which is an affective state 
that has an object—people that we admire upon reflection.  
Admiration has also a motivational component, as it leads us to emulate the 
admired person. Since we see the exemplar as the image of the ideal self, it gives us a 
standard to strive towards. Doing actions and seeing the world as the people we admire 
make us more virtuous. Through emulation of the exemplar, we can come to have a life 
that is desired, as it is a life that the exemplar desires.  
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DIFFICULTIES FOR MORAL EXEMPLAR THEORY 
 
1. Introduction 
Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory is constructed out of a single point of 
origin, which is the people we admire upon reflection.95 Although this may be more 
concrete than other complicated ethical theories, its simplicity does not make it immune 
and without its share of criticisms. One may raise an issue with the foundational structure 
of the theory, which are the people for whom we have admiration for upon reflection. 
This is what this section is set out to do; to raise issues within Zagzebski’s moral theory 
by casting doubt on the adequacy of the foundation on which the theory rests. We will 
then see if the problem can be avoided within a religious framework, namely Christianity, 
or if the problem is exacerbated.  
What if our emotions become distorted, or they go astray? There is certainly a 
malleability to emotions, and admiration is not an exception to this rule. An emotion can 
either fit or not fit its object. As we discussed in the first section, emotions correlate to 
“thick” affective concepts. Humor and amusement are a good example: someone can 
judge something as either humorous or not humorous, and the emotion that one would 
feel that correlates this judgment would be amusement. However, an emotion is only 
 






operating properly when it fits an appropriately correlated judgment; amusement would 
be properly fitted to a comedian, but not a funeral. The judgment has to be correct in 
order for the emotion to work properly and “fit” its correct object. However, admiration 
is not a sacrosanct emotion and has been inappropriately matched with despicable figures 
throughout history. Nazi Germany’s admiration for Hitler, or many people’s admiration 
for Andrew Jackson and Christopher Columbus. We want to admit that these people are 
wrong, and to some degree, evil. Yet, whole people groups and countries admired them. 
Is this enough to discredit Zagzebski’s theory? How does one know admiration is a 
reliable guide to the admirable given the possibility it could go wrong? 
2. Aristotelian Problem 
Zagzebski’s moral theory may run into a similar problem Aristotle has with his 
own moral theory. Aristotle defines virtue as a mean between two vices, one of excess 
and one of deficiency. How one understands this mean relative to themselves is “by 
which a person with practical judgment would determine it.”96 Aristotle goes on in book 
VI to discuss practical judgment [phronesis] as a virtue, so there seems to be a circularity 
problem. In other words, we cannot know the mean apart from having access to the 
discerning capacities of someone who has a fully developed virtue of practical wisdom. 
But this means that, prior to possessing the virtue ourselves, our ability to correctly 
identify what is virtuous depends on guidance from one who already possesses virtue. 
But how do we discern who that is?  It seems as if identifying who is virtuous requires 
some prior understanding of what virtue consists in. But if we are not yet virtuous 
 






ourselves, our understanding depends first on submitting ourselves to the guidance of one 
who is already virtuous. 
Aristotle defines virtue as a disposition and differentiates it between feelings and 
predispositions in nature. We have the ability to cultivate virtue by habits, as none of the 
virtues are given to us by nature. “I am speaking of virtue of character, for this is 
concerned with feelings and actions, and among these there is excess and deficiency, and 
the mean.”97 Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions. Aristotle describes feelings as 
“those things which are accompanied by pleasure or pain.”98 We have a natural 
disposition to have certain feelings and emotions, but they are not what makes us morally 
praiseworthy or blameworthy.99 It is when the feeling is connected with an action, then 
we are able to be morally responsible for our character. According to David Bostock, the 
full doctrine of the mean should be  
[that] each virtue is associated with a particular feeling or emotion, and 
this indeed is what distinguishes one virtue from another. But the virtuous 
disposition is one which involves a harmony between emotion and reason; 
both pull in the same direction.100 
Since virtue has to do with emotions and feelings, then there must be a mean for 
our emotions. In fact, Aristotle’s discussion over certain virtues throughout the 
Nicomachean Ethics seems to bend this way. For instance, when he is discussing 
courage, he claims there needs to be the right amount of fear the courageous man needs 
to have. He can neither be too bold nor too cowardly.101 Since admiration is an emotion, 
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there needs to be a mean for it if we are to achieve the virtue of being admirable or being 
like those whom we admire. 
If we take Aristotle’s definition of virtue, then to be virtuous, we need to tailor 
our emotions to fit their objects in the way a practically wise person would. However, in 
order for us to know how exactly our emotions should be tailored to the given situation, 
we need to know how a practically wise person would do so. How do we find a 
practically wise person? If it is by the virtue of practical wisdom, then it seems that there 
is a circularity problem. Or if it by a capacity to recognize practical wisdom where it 
exists, then we also have a problem: practical wisdom is a virtue, and until we, ourselves, 
are virtuous, we need the guidance of the practically wise person to accurately identify 
instances of virtue. 
Aristotle’s virtue theory is not the only theory that is prone to this problem, 
however, as it seems that we run into the same circular problem in Zagzebski’s moral 
theory. Since admiration is an emotion, it has its own vices of excess and deficiency. We 
can either admire the right and wrong people. It is only through admiring the correct 
person that we can accurately admire and become virtuous. How are we to know what the 
correct “mean” of admirability is without finding the right person to admire? For one to 
find out who should be correctly admired we need to have admirability properly in line 
with reason. 
3. Cultural Problem 
Furthermore, what if we admire the wrong people? We may have a natural 
capacity to admire, but what if we were put in a society that admires evil people? Even 






virtues properly, and some may need to be brought up correctly straight from childhood 
in order to become virtuous.102 Both Aristotle and Zagzebski allude to the notion that 
emotions are malleable to some degree. Even in Aristotle’s own virtue theory, we tailor 
our emotions to hit the mean, whether it be the correct use of fear in courageous 
moments, or the right shame to know that some actions are wrong.103 For Zagzebski, 
emotions need to fit their right object. If they do not fit their right object upon reflection, 
then we change our emotional disposition towards that object.  
Zagzebski is aware of this worry, as she discusses Nazi Germany’s admiration for 
Hitler. She cites this study done by Claudia Koonz regarding the moral consciousness of 
the Nazis. In this study, it seemed that the Nazis agreed about many of the other people 
that we would find admirable.  
The problem, in Koonz’s view, is that human beings have the capacity to 
rule out of the moral community whole classes of persons, and many 
groups of people in history have exercised that capacity, leading to 
genocide and other heinous crimes.104  
Zagzebski’s own hypothesis on this matter is a bit more intentional. First, a Nazi would 
have to reflect upon his admiration for Hitler and compare Hitler with other people he 
admires. Through this comparison, then, the Nazis would have figured out that Hitler 
should not have been admired because of inconsistencies in the disposition of 
admiration.105 Zagzebski goes on to suggest that, although there are discrepancies of who 
we admire, we do not say that maybe the Nazis are right, and we are wrong. “We trust 
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our dispositions to feel admiration and contempt when they survive reflection over time, 
and I think we are right to do so.”106 
However, is Zagzebski correct in this assessment? Can one merely compare two 
different exemplars and stop admiring the worse one? Nazism is an extreme example in 
history, but it still raises problems for Zagzebski’s theory. I believe the Nazi’s admiration 
for Hitler was stronger than she leads on, at least strong enough to withstand a 
comparison of a morally good person against Hitler. Jean-Paul Sartre’s book, Anti-Semite 
and Jew, is an intriguing discussion over how anti-Semite’s think and rationalize their 
beliefs. His focus here is the relationship between anti-Semites and the Jewish 
community. Of course, Sartre’s approach could be applied to other relationships between 
discriminated groups their discriminators. However, Sartre’s point, and the point that is 
necessary for this section, is that anti-Semites, Nazis, or any other people who 
discriminate against others, have a deeply rooted worldview that makes another group an 
enemy to the overall good. As we have briefly seen and will further explore, culture and 
the people around us have a crucial role in our moral development and our worldview.   
One may say that anti-Semites just have differing opinions that were given by 
either terrible exemplars or an awful upbringing. If we show this anti-Semite a better 
exemplar to follow that does not discriminate against the Jewish community, then he will 
no longer have anti-Semitic dispositions. However, Sartre sees a critical problem with the 
framing of this problem, as it does not have to do with just mere “opinion.” The word 
opinion could just boil down to nothing more than certain points of views or tastes, and 
that all points of views and tastes are equally valid, since “all tastes are natural; all 
 






opinions are permitted.”107 Of course, much like Zagzebski, one would want to say that 
anti-Semitism and discrimination are more than just a natural, let alone justified, taste or 
opinion. 
Sartre first opens the discussion of anti-Semitism and its infection in people’s 
lives. I quote him at length below:  
At the same time, accustomed as have been since the Revolution to look at 
every object in an analytic spirit, that is to say, as a composite whose 
elements can be separated, we look upon persons and characters as 
mosaics in which each stone coexists with the others without that 
coexistence affecting the nature of the whole. Thus anti-Semitic opinion 
appears to us to be a molecule that can enter into combination with other 
molecules of any origin whatsoever without undergoing any alteration. A 
man may be a good father and a good husband, a conscientious citizen, 
highly cultivated, philanthropic, and in addition an anti-Semite. He may 
like fishing and the pleasures of love, may be tolerant in matters of 
religion, full of generous notions on the condition of the natives in Central 
Africa, and in addition detest the Jews. If he does not like them, we say, it 
is because his experience has shown him that they are bad, because 
statistics have taught him that they are dangerous, because certain 
historical factors have influenced his judgment. Thus this opinion seems to 
be the result of external causes… [those who study these causes] succeed 
in revealing a strictly objective situation that determines an equally 
objective current of opinion, and this they call anti-Semitism, for which 
they can draw up charts and determine the variations from 1870 to 
1944.108 
In this quote, Sartre is suggesting what this section has been stating up to now: 
upbringing and those around you have critical importance in how you will be shaped 
morally. As stated earlier, this is more than just what actions are right and wrong, but 
who is right and wrong. Anti-Semites see the world, history, and statistics, in a certain 
way that justifies their discrimination. Notice here how anti-Semitism is just another part 
of their experience, just like being a father or the enjoyment of fishing: they see nothing 
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wrong with their prejudice. This is especially troubling, since anti-Semites may not only 
filter history and statistics but other people as well, such as “better exemplars” that 
should correct their prejudices. Is it actually possible for someone to remove their lens if 
they find nothing wrong with it, since it may be just another part of their daily life? 
 Pertaining to the anti-Semite’s worldview, Sartre says that  
It has become evident that no external factor can induce anti-Semitism in 
the anti-Semite. Anti-Semitism is a free and total choice of oneself, a 
comprehensive attitude that one adopts not only toward Jews but toward 
men in general, toward history and society; it is at one and the same time a 
passion and a concentration of the world. No doubt in the case of a given 
anti-Semite certain characteristics will be more marked than in another. 
But they are always all present at the same time, and they influence each 
other.109 
Anti-Semitism creates a distorted lens of how one sees the world, history, and people. 
This lens may even profligate Zagzebski’s problem by distorting how one sees other 
exemplars and could be a problem for her correction by comparing moral exemplars 
solution she proposed above. For example, if a Nazi admires Hitler and Jesus, they may 
only see the similarities (whatever those might be) in their character. Jesus showing 
compassion and love to those in his moral community may be the same as Hitler showing 
similar attitudes towards his own moral community. Even discrepancies between the two 
would be filtered through the Nazi’s admiration for both. This filtration of exemplars 
becomes even more apparent when one may try to build a bridge between traits found in 
the discriminated community and the Nazi’s moral community, as he would not consider 
a Jewish person to possess any exemplary traits due to their supposed moral status. 
Furthermore, anti-Semitism is not just a rational calculation, but a passion according to 
Sartre. The emotions of hate and anger are certainly involved in any discrimination, and 
 






these precede the facts that call forth this anger and hatred. However, for Sartre, the word 
“facts” have a double meaning, as these emotions can also feed upon the “facts”—or how 
the anti-Semite interprets the world—to the point that he “interprets them in a special 
way so that they [the Jews] may become truly offensive.”110 
 However, one may be able to solve this issue by bridging the gaps between the 
discriminated and the discriminators, perhaps by showing that there are similar positive 
traits that one shares with another. However, Sartre does not think that this applies to a 
solution. Again, if we remember that anti-Semitism is a passion that creates a distorted 
lens, then even positive traits, even ones that are admirable, will be seen in a negative 
light. He states that  
a man who finds it entirely natural to denounce other men cannot have our 
conception of humanity; he does not see even those whom he aids in the 
same light as we do. His generosity, his kindness are not like our kindness, 
our generosity.111  
The anti-Semitic’s prejudice even affects his positive traits that he may have, such as 
kindness and generosity and any other regularly esteemed virtues.  
This tainting of traits also apply to how the anti-Semite might see the positive 
characteristics of Jews. Sartre says further,  
to the anti-Semite, intelligence is Jewish; he can thus disdain it in all 
tranquility, like all the other virtues which the Jew possesses. They are so 
many ersatz attributes that the Jew cultivates in place of that balanced 
mediocrity which he will never have.112  
Even the virtues which might be admirable to the anti-Semite are distorted and even 
disdained because they belong to the discriminated community. The anti-Semite would 
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rather be mediocre in the “right” group than virtuous in the “evil and wrong” group. 
According to the anti-Semite’s thinking, a person’s virtue comes from being in the right 
community and correct side of history—not by qualities that actually make him a good 
person.113 This discrimination not only belittles the Jew but raises the anti-Semite’s self-
esteem and worth. 
By treating the Jew as an inferior and pernicious being, I [the anti-Semite] 
affirm at the same time that I belong to the elite. This elite, in contrast to 
those of modern times which are based on merit or labor, closely 
resembles an aristocracy of birth. There is nothing I have to do merit my 
superiority, and neither can I lose it. It is given once and for all. It is a 
thing.114 
Sartre believes that the anti-Semite gets his privilege from the very group he wishes to 
destroy, as without this group he would be like anyone else in France.115 It seems that this 
lens not only distorts our view of certain people groups, but traits that one may find 
admirable.  
Deeply-rooted worldviews like anti-Semitism, or any other forms of racism, can 
distort our view of qualities, which is exactly what we admire in certain people, so much 
so that we want to have and imitate these characteristics. However, if certain cultures can 
distort positive qualities seen in discriminated groups, such as a generosity found in the 
Jewish community is not the same “true generosity” that the anti-Semites display, then 
can a connection be made between these two groups? Taking Zagzebski’s argument that 
one corrects their admiration for an exemplar by comparing them to another, what if that 
other exemplar is associated with these qualities the anti-Semite deems as “evil” or part 
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of the community outside of the moral community. Worse, what if the other exemplar is a 
part of that community?  
Sartre says further that “if the Jew did not exist the anti-Semite would invent 
him”116 and compares the worldview of the anti-Semitic to Manichaeism, a belief that 
there is an inherent battle between good and evil. The anti-Semite, and the Aryans, are on 
the good side, and the Jews are on the side of evil. Further, the anti-Semite believes that 
evil may be a sort of metaphysical component of the Jewish community and that they are 
only able to do evil.117 Sartre continues and says  
underneath the bitterness of the anti-Semite is concealed the optimistic 
belief that harmony will be re-established of itself, once Evil is eliminated. 
His task is therefore purely negative: there is no question of building a 
new society, but only of purifying the one which exists.118  
What is interesting to note here is the fact that anti-Semites may have similar goals as a 
virtuous person would have, such as the desire to make the world a better place. 
However, their version of a better world involves something heinous and awful, which is 
bringing about the destruction of a certain people group. Although the anti-Semites and 
the virtuous person have similar views, it may only be similar in name, as it is 
fundamentally different in kind by the very means sought to achieve it. This could also 
prove difficult for Zagzebski, as maybe a comparison between two exemplars may come 
down to their end goals, and the one with the nobler goals may be the better exemplar. 
The anti-Semite believes that one makes the world a better place by getting rid of the 
Jewish community, and thus through that lens view Hitler as an exemplar since he has the 
admirable traits to achieve that goal. However, the anti-Semite will view people like 
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Nelson Mandela as lacking this trait, since the end goal of making the world a better 
place does not have the final solution in his means. It would seem that one would need to 
judge the means by which they bring about the virtuous goal, and not merely the goal 
itself, in order to correctly judge who you should emulate. 
Continuing, Sartre says that the anti-Semite acts with tact, or the “[adoption of] a 
certain conception of the world, one that is traditional, and synthetic; one for which he 
can give no reason.”119 Both the Jew and the anti-Semite act with this sort of tact, and 
Sartre has mainly been focusing on the anti-Semite’s tact. Tact is “in no sense critical, 
and we might add that it takes on its whole meaning on in a strictly defined community 
with common ideas, mores, and customs.”120 However, the anti-Semite’s tact is 
unnatural, as it slides into particularism. “For the name of this tact [particularism], the 
anti-Semite denounces him [The Jew] as a particular case and excludes him from the 
national community.”121 Certain worldviews, especially ones that single out a community 
or people as “evil” will exclude these people groups as particular cases and therefore out 
of the national (i.e., moral, in Koonz’s verbiage) community. Thus, the anti-Semite’s 
worldview does not even consider those he prejudices against as people in the moral 
community. They may in fact obstruct making the world a better place for the moral 
community. This problem that Sartre brings up aligns closer to Koonz’s view on the 
matter, as the Nazis were able to agree on who is an admirable person while still being 
able to exclude people from the moral (or what Sartre calls the “national”) community. 
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This problem seems that it cannot simply be solved by merely comparing exemplars to 
one another, it is a deeper seeded issue.  
 Finally, Sartre wraps up his discussion over the worldview:  
Let us recall that anti-Semitism is a conception of the Manichaean and 
primitive world in which hatred for the Jew arises as a great explanatory 
myth. We have seen that it is not a matter of isolated opinion, but of the 
total choice that man in a situation makes of himself and of the meaning of 
the universe. It is the expression of a certain ferocious and mystical sense 
of real property.122 
 
Anti-Semitism is a worldview, and not merely something we can explain away through 
reasoning or appealing to better moral exemplars. It is a lens through which people see 
the world, history, and other people. As we have seen, it is also a way in which people 
can judge qualities, regardless of if they are positive or negative characteristics. Sartre’s 
characterization of the anti-Semite’s distorted lens further exacerbates Koonz’s problems 
that Zagzebski tries to explain away. As we have seen, this may be a much more difficult 
and troubling issue. 
There are even less horrific cases that accentuate this problem with Zagzebski’s 
theory. Think of people like Christopher Columbus, a once-celebrated hero who has a 
federal holiday named after him. Who is now reviled as an evil man, with people wanting 
to change the holiday from “Columbus Day” to “Indigenous People Day?” Statues that 
celebrated this once revered figure are now being asked to be torn down, and there seems 
to be a lot of controversy around this plea. In an article that discusses Columbus’ 
controversial acts, explaining why the historical figure draws so much controversy 
nowadays, it concludes with this: 
 






This historical record has cast Columbus' legacy under a cloud of 
controversy. Protests at Columbus Day parades, efforts to eliminate him 
from classroom curricula and calls for changing the federal holiday have 
all followed. Beginning in 1991, dozens of cities and several states have 
adopted Indigenous Peoples’ Day, a holiday that celebrates the history and 
contributions of Native Americans—rather than Columbus.123 
Many people see Columbus’ atrocities and failures as more than enough reason to no 
longer celebrate him but instead celebrate those people groups, he tormented and held 
prejudice against. 
However, this is not a cut and dry issue. There are still people who see Columbus 
as an exemplar. Some may see Columbus as just a product of his time, as the ideas of 
democracy and freedom, which were products of The Enlightenment, were not yet 
pertinent in his own society, and therefore should not be judged by these standards.124 
Instead, these flawed exemplars may show us how far we have grown as a society, but we 
can still respect their positive attributes.  
Andrew Jackson is in a similar boat, as he is another figure in history that is 
veiled in controversy. The seventh president of The United States has a terrible history 
with respect to enslaved people and Native Americans, yet we still see his face on the 
twenty-dollar bill and there are still statues of him. Jackson’s legacy is enshrined in 
discussion regarding his bravery, challenge of the political establishment of the time, 
military expertise, and dedication to westward expansion and exploration.125 Yet, he 
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strongly supported and profited off, slavery. Not only that, the brutality of the trail of 
tears is one of the darkest stains on American history, as he created and enforced the 
horrific Indian Removal Act, which resulted in the forced displacement of nearly 50,000 
Native Americans.126  
Admiration for people like Christopher Columbus and Andrew Jackson leads one 
to see a consistency amongst cultures and their admired heroes and connects this 
discussion to Sartre’s own over anti-Semitism. The ability to see another people group as 
outside the moral realm is an unfortunately ubiquitous thread in all societies. Much like 
the Jewish population was seen as another so too does the Native American population at 
the time of Jackson’s presidency and Columbus’s voyage to the Americas. Sartre’s 
discussion regarding admiration for the Nazi’s can be in the same boat as admiring 
Columbus and Jackson; only by trivializing their policies and views on other people can 
we actually find them admirable. Many, if not all, would agree that what the Nazis, 
Columbus, and Jackson did were horrible and atrocious acts that should not be 
downplayed. Yet, it would seem that to hold these people as some sort of examples that 
we should follow and imitate would be to whitewash their obviously immoral deeds. 
Even people like Thomas Jefferson, a revered and often favorite president to 
many people, cannot escape this controversy. As a founder of America and the writer of 
the Declaration of Independence, he is seen as an important figurehead in American 
history. Yet, he owned slaves, and like many of his contemporaries, probably thought 
certain groups of people less than he was. Interestingly, Zagzebski writes about Jefferson, 
too, as a way of discussing the “unity of virtue” thesis. Here she discusses that Jefferson’s 
 






attitude towards freeing his slaves was complex but was motivated to free them. 
However, due to his profligate lifestyle, he was always in debt and unable to free them 
because of this.  
This seems to show how the vice of overspending can prevent one from 
having the full virtue of justice…Jefferson seems to have been a just 
person, far better than most, but it could be argued that he was not able to 
be fully just given his problems with money.127  
Although she does not offer a “unity of virtues” thesis, she says this is an interesting case 
where a vice with respect to one disposition can harm potential virtues with respect to 
other dispositions from being fully expressed.128 
With these and many other, controversial characters in mind, we find it hard to 
say whether we can call them exemplars or near exemplars. We have seen some people 
who truly idolize them, whether it be in statues, dollar bills, or their enshrining in history. 
These figures are also reviled by many, and there seems to be a lot of discussion about 
tearing down monuments, replacing their faces on monetary notes, and foregoing the 
rose-tinted glass surrounding their portrayals for a more honest, and vicious, portrait of 
them. 
These controversial characters may further problematize Zagzebski’s theory. If 
people who live in the same society cannot even agree if certain people are admirable, 
what hope is there for moral exemplar theory? Even though it was mentioned why these 
people are controversial, some still believe there is good reason to admire them. Some 
argue that although they held certain beliefs that are wrong and outdated, that is no reason 
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to stop idolizing them. We can still believe them to be good people because of what they 
promoted, and what they were able to do, while still holding these erroneously and awful 
beliefs. Although this section is not here to defend or condemn these people, it still 
highlights an extensive problem within Exemplarism Theory; how do we know who to 
admire, and to find contempt for? This is controversial on a societal basis but proliferates 
when you look at it from culture to culture. Even if all these people are, or at one time 
were, admirable, it still goes back to the original problem, what if we admire the wrong 
person? 
Since almost all people are a mix of positive and negative traits, admiration will 
almost always be extended to people despite negative traits, which can be excused or 
treated as of lesser importance. For example, we may say that despite many of these 
figures’ relation to minority groups, their respected and admirable traits outweigh their 
outdated and unethical viewpoints. However, an issue for Zagzebski is that we first 
admire then extract from the exemplar a fuller analysis of what makes them admirable. If 
we admire Jackson or Columbus despite their mistreatments of Native Americans, our 
analysis will function by trivializing their mistreatment, leading one to conclude that this 
mistreatment might be made light of if that person did many great acts. If these people 
are exemplars or admirable people despite having overseen the marginalization of whole 
people groups, then marginalizing whole people groups must not be that bad according to 









4. Humean Problem 
David Hume and his empiricist view of morality could also undermine 
Zagzebski’s moral theory by adding to the cultural problem discussed above. Hume is 
famous for saying that reason can never motivate the will, only passions can.  
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it 
follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason; and that because reason 
alone, as we have already prov’d, can never have such influence. Morals 
excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly 
impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore are not 
conclusions of our reason.129 
Here we see that Hume argues that reason cannot move us to act morally, in fact only 
passions can. More than that: reason cannot tell us what is moral, values are contingent 
on passions. Although I may give one reason for saying why someone should not be 
admired, that may not be enough for someone to admire them, they need certain 
sentiments towards the exemplar in order to emulate them. Zagzebski and Hume both 
note that emotions are what drives people to act morally. For Zagzebski, it is the emotion 
of admiration, which has both an affective and motivating component. Hume argues that 
the passions are what drives our “moral sense.” 
 Another principle that drives what we deem virtuous or vicious is the notions of 
pleasure and pain. “The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure 
or pain, and when these sensations are remov’d, both from our thought and feeling, we 
are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of desire or volition.”130 Hume 
goes on to say that 
moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain 
and pleasure, and that whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives 
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us satisfaction, by the survey of reflection, is of course virtuous; as 
everything of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious…virtue and 
power of producing love or pride, vice and the power of producing 
humility or hatred.131 
We seem to associate pleasure, love, and pride with what characteristics we deem as 
virtuous, and pain, hate, and humiliation with what we deem as vicious.  
Hume differentiates between natural and artificial virtues. “I have already hinted, 
that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural; but that there are some virtues, that 
produce pleasure and approbation through artifice or contrivance, which arises from the 
circumstances and necessities of mankind.”132 Natural virtues are actions that we approve 
of that do not depend on social conventions or agreed upon social rules. Artificial virtues 
are those that vary from culture to culture and are agreed upon a good for their success in 
impersonal cooperation.133 
Through the force of sympathy, and the cumulative effects on society, we come to 
have a “sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues.”134 This allows us to sympathize 
with actions that tend to promote the goodness of mankind. Hume uses the example of 
justice, which he deems as an artificial virtue. Justice, according to Hume, is merely an 
artificial invention that makes people moral.135 In fact, most of what we deem as virtuous 
is just approving actions that benefit mankind.  
This presumption must become a certainty when we find that most of 
those qualities, which we naturally approve of, have actually that 
tendency, and render a man a proper member of society: While the 
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qualities, which we naturally disapprove of, have a contrary tendency, and 
render any intercourse with the person dangerous or disagreeable.136 
Although it seems that we naturally approve of certain actions and virtues, it is merely 
only because they benefit society in some way, or make that person a proper member of 
society.  
Hume does mention that we have these natural virtues, which are self-esteem, 
goodness and benevolence, and natural abilities such as prudence and wit. These natural 
virtues also arise out of the force of sympathy, except that they do not depend on any 
positive effect on society. Again, these are deemed as virtues because we 1) approve of 
them, and 2) they produce pleasure. “Our approval arises as the result of sympathy 
bringing into our minds the pleasure that the trait produces for its possessor or for 
others.”137 Virtue is something that we merely approve of because of its ability to 
produce pleasure, either to its owner or to others around them. 
The problem this lends for Zagzebski’s theory is that virtue is by far and large a 
social convention for Hume. While there may be natural virtues, they seem very 
dependent on society as well. As we have seen, these too depend on pleasure and 
approval, not merely any sort of admirability. Take military might as an example, which 
is a form of self-esteem and pride, which is a virtue for Hume. Although there has been 
much destruction to human society, many people are still in awe of the spectacular heroes 
of war. A “more immediate sympathy” is able to override this sense of shame and distaste 
for war heroes and call them virtuous.138 Again, if we admire war heroes despite War’s 
destructive nature, and even terrible actions that these heroes have done, our analysis of 
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these heroes may trivialize these immoral acts. This could lead one to conclude that 
destruction, war crimes, and immoral acts are justified as long as that “more immediate 
sympathy” is able to override that sense of distaste. 
Connecting this back to the controversial characters of history example we may 
start to see a problem. Whenever we see controversial people become exemplars for a 
few people, it further shows our capacity to admire may be off and culturally dependent. I 
argue that Zagzebski wants to say something stronger than admiration is merely 
sympathy mixed with pleasure and approval. Hume provides two critiques in regard to 
Zagzebski’s theory: (1) virtue is partially determined by social convention and is widely 
influenced by it. (2) Any idea of what is virtuous, and likely to be admirable, is 
determined or influenced by social convention. Although Zagzebski may be able to push 
back on Hume’s first critique, his second still stands firm—if one’s understanding of 
what is virtuous is merely a social convention, then one will admire people whose actions 
display these culturally dependent virtues. 
5. Moral Luck Problem 
Another problem Zagzebski faces is one of moral luck, which is something 
similar which Aristotle deals within his virtue ethics. At the beginning of the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the ways in which we can acquire happiness, 
otherwise known as eudemonia. Eudemonia is acquired through one becoming virtuous, 
but there also seems to be a bit of luck involved. I quote Aristotle at length below: 
Nevertheless, it appears that there is an additional need of external goods, 
as we said, since it is impossible, or not easy, to engage in beautiful 
actions if one is not equipped for them. For many things are done, as if by 
instruments, by means of friends and wealth and political power, and those 
who lack certain things, such as good ancestry, good children, and good 






in appearance, or of bad descent, or solitary and childless is not very apt to 
be happy, and is still less so perhaps if he were to have utterly corrupt 
children or friends, or good ones who had died. So as we said, there seems 
to be an additional need of this sort of prosperity, which is why some 
people rank good fortune on the same level as happiness, while others give 
that rank to virtue.139 
It would seem for someone to become happy, they would need external goods that are 
mainly outside of their control, whether it be good ancestry, looks, or the longevity of 
good children and friends. If eudemonia relies heavily on luck, then the same could be 
said about virtue. 
Although we have a natural ability to acquire the virtues, they are not innately in 
us.140 This means that we need someone to show us how to become virtuous, which is 
why Aristotle stresses the importance of moral education. We do not accidentally stumble 
into becoming virtuous by doing virtuous actions, but there has to be an intent and reason 
for doing said actions.141 As was noted in the Aristotelian problem above, one needs a 
person with practical wisdom to guide them on becoming practically wise, and therefore 
virtuous. Furthermore, one can only become virtuous if one can imitate the way a 
virtuous person does just, temperate, or any other virtuous action.  
Additionally, as we have seen, how are we to know who is the virtuous person? 
Certainly, this goes back to our circularity problem mentioned above. However, assuming 
that we can find these virtuous people, there still is a problem regarding moral luck. 
Aristotle recognizes that there seems to be a bit of luck with upbringing and education as 
well, especially how it pertains to one becoming virtuous.  
It is the same way in the case of the virtues, for by acting in our dealing 
with people some of us become just, others unjust, and by acting in 
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frightening situations and getting habituated to be afraid or to be 
confident, some of us become courageous and others become cowards.142  
Aristotle goes on to say that the right habituation does not happen whenever we start to 
want to become virtuous, it starts in our childhood. “It makes no small difference, then, to 
be habituated in this way or in that straight from childhood, but an enormous difference, 
or rather all the difference.”143 Even your childhood recurring environment is purely a 
matter of luck; one does not get to choose their upbringing. 
Again, this sort of moral upbringing seems to be largely out of our control, yet it 
plays an enormous role in our moral character and development, which then plays a part 
in our ability to achieve happiness or flourish.144 Continuing his discussion Aristotle 
again stresses the importance of a correct moral education and upbringing.  
For the sort of virtue that belongs to character is concerned with pleasures 
and pains, since it is on account of pleasure that we perform base actions, 
and on the account of pain that we refrain from beautiful actions. Hence it 
is necessary to be brought up in some way straight from childhood, as 
Plato says, so as to take delight and feel pain in those things in which one 
ought, for this is the right education.145 
Again, there seems to be a stress on the right upbringing for one to become 
virtuous. More importantly, Aristotle says that this moral education is the right education.  
As this section implies, there seems to be a lot of luck involved, and much of how 
you turn out morally seems to be out of your control. This is not a small difference, but 
Aristotle says this makes all the difference in our moral lives. Those who are lucky are 
under the tutelage of virtuous parents and teachers and become virtuous, so they did not 
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need to determine who the virtuous person is. Those who are unlucky end up not virtuous 
and would not be able to determine who the virtuous person is even if they wanted to. 
How are we to assign moral blame to someone if they are not brought up with the right 
moral education or upbringing? What if they live in a culture that focuses on actions that 
are deemed as “good” which are connected to pleasure? What if this culture instills 
different values on certain actions, which relates back to the cultural problem that was 
discussed earlier? Certainly, intuition tells us that we want to say moral value and 
character is immune to these sorts of problems, but luck dictates so much of it, it may be 
hard, if not impossible, to assign any sort of responsibility for one’s character and value. 
This is a colossal problem, not just for Aristotle and Zagzebski, but for moral philosophy 
in general.  
To help further this specific problem, Bernard Williams says that 
the idea that one’s whole life can in some such way be rendered immune 
to luck has perhaps rarely prevailed since, but its place has been taken by 
the still powerfully influential idea that there is one basic form of value, 
moral value, which is immune to luck and—in the crucial term of the 
idea’s most rigorous exponent— ‘unconditioned.’ Both the disposition to 
correct moral judgment, and the objects of such judgment, are on this view 
free from external contingency, for both are, in their related ways, the 
product of an unconditioned will.146 
Although we want to say that our values, who we are, and what we become are all 
immune to luck, that may not be the case. Williams and Thomas Nagel, another 
philosopher who introduced the idea of moral luck, argue that four different types of luck 
influence our character and ethical choices. However, we are only going to deal with two 
forms of moral luck. The one we have been discussing is what Nagel defines as 
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constitutive luck, which is “the kind of person you are, where this is not just a question of 
what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations, capacities, and temperament.”147 
Another form of luck is circumstantial luck, which boils down to the kind of problems 
that one faces.148 Nagel likens this to a Nazi collaborator in 1930’s Germany who is 
condemned for war crimes and committing morally atrocious acts, even though their 
presence in Nazi Germany was beyond his control. On the contrary, he may have lived 
quiet and even exemplary lives if they moved outside of Germany before 1929.149 
As we have seen, moral luck seems to enter Aristotle in these two ways; it is 
largely not up to us how we turn out, but more so with our own upbringing and education 
(or lack of). And second, even if we do learn how to be virtuous through our upbringing, 
we may never get the chance to display these virtues. Suppose there is someone who 
learns what courage is, and even how to act courageously in any given situation. 
However, due to terrible circumstances, never gets to display this knowledge, would we 
then say this person was courageous? Of course not.  
Furthermore, we can connect this with the Nazi collaborator that Nagel uses as an 
example, which might be able to connect the other problems we have mentioned. What if 
someone’s upbringing and education tell them that following national policy, no matter 
what the policy demanded, was deemed as courageous, and even virtuous. They, then, 
followed the Nazi regime in 1930 Germany. Could we assign that person blame for 
committing atrocious acts? Following one’s nation could be courageous, say, in Russia or 
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America, which helped liberate people from the Holocaust. However, then, even these 
nations did immoral things during and after World War II. 
This seems to be a problem for Zagzebski too, in the fact that it may just boil 
down to luck of who we see as our exemplars. Even if the emotion of admiration is 
nonmalleable to cultural forces, there still may be a problem with who it latches on to. 
What if the best person someone meets or hears about in our lifetime is only Hitler, 
Stalin, Robert E. Lee, or Andrew Jackson, can we prescribe blame to the person imitating 
them? What if our moral education told us that the traits these people exhibit are, in fact, 
virtuous, and we should act like them, is it possible to say that this is wrong? Even 
though exemplars show us how we ought to live, there is still luck in the fact of who our 
exemplars may be. In effect, Zagzebski has to hold that there is some native human 
faculty of admiration that is immune to luck and, when employed reflectively, reliable 
regardless of upbringing. Even those raised by Nazis will, upon reflection, be able to 
discern that Hitler is not admirable. 
6. A Problem in Christian Ethics as Well 
We can sidestep these issues if there were a default exemplar of goodness, one 
which everyone should admire. An institution that lifts an exemplar and encourages its 
members to see the exalted one as an exemplar independent of the individual’s feelings of 
admiration, one which tells everyone that this is someone who you should admire, even if 
you personally do not want to. This is what many religions, especially Christianity, 
argues. Christianity has an exemplar, namely Jesus Christ, that should sidestep many of 
these issues. Within Christian Ethics, there is an emphasis to imitate Christ in our actions, 






Jesus seems to be the prime example that the Christian religion would want us to follow. 
Jesus’ exemplarship bypasses many problems dealing with luck and cultural malleability. 
Although we may latch onto human exemplars, Christianity proposes a uniform exemplar 
that everyone can and should imitate. Even though we may have different moral 
education, Jesus is our example that we should be striving for. Some would even posit 
that there is no luck involved, since God can speak to us through natural theology and 
showcase Christ as the supreme exemplar to follow.150 Even Zagzebski explains how 
Christian Ethics a natural candidate for an exemplarist approach because of the centrality 
of Jesus Christ as the moral exemplar in Christian teaching.151 
However, despite common belief, all of these problems that were described above 
still arise in Christian Ethics. Since we have no record of the historical Jesus, we rely 
heavily on the canonized narratives we call the gospels. We could ask the apparent 
skeptical questions, such as can the gospels be legitimate resources to knowing who Jesus 
is or was? How do we know these are actually written by the disciples of Jesus? Many 
other questions can put the gospels in question. However, let’s say, for the sake of the 
argument, that the gospels are legitimate resources to knowing who Jesus was and that 
they are actually written by his disciples. We still run into the same issues for 
Zagzebski’s moral exemplarism theory, even when it is developed within a Christian 
context, and even on the assumption that the gospels are genuine first-hand accounts of 
Jesus’ life. 
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To see why, let’s consider some insight of Bart Ehrman in his book Jesus Before 
the Gospels, which takes a look at how Jesus is remembered by his disciples and other 
noncanonical gospel writers. Ehrman examines different interpretations of Jesus 
throughout history, specifically how he was remembered when the gospels were being 
written. One of the ways he goes about this is through the idea of both individual and 
collective memory, as he hopes to answer his own question by way of understanding how 
memory works.  
When we remember the past, whether we are thinking simply our 
individual thoughts or are reconstructing our previous history as a 
collective whole, as a society, we do so, always and necessarily, in light of 
our present situation. The past is not a fixed entity back there in time.152  
Even in today’s time, Jesus is remembered much differently. Ehrman gives two 
examples of contemporary books that were written about Jesus, the first is Reza Aslan’s 
Zealot, which shows Jesus as a Jewish Zealot who was staging a coup against the Roman 
government in preparation to take back his homeland. The second is Bill O’Reilly’s 
Killing Jesus, which showed a Jesus who was upset that the Jewish people had to pay 
tribute to the Roman authorities. According to O’Reilly, Jesus’ main concern, and 
message, was that he wanted smaller government and lower taxes.153 
This shows two things: first, there are wildly different ways people interpret 
Jesus’ life and mission, whether it is from a religious aspect or not. Although these are 
just two extreme cases, I am sure there are many more different interpretations of Jesus’ 
life and teaching between these two views. Second, and more importantly, Jesus’ own life 
and teachings seem to be somewhat culturally malleable for a given goal or purpose. The 
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way he is seen and remembered has a lot to do with the culture around you, and this is 
what Ehrman stresses in his book: different people remember Jesus differently. This also 
means that our memory, in a way, is malleable and helps us with our present situation or 
to provide specific reasons and answers.154 
Ehrman says that, ultimately, his point is that 
[the] invention of memories of Jesus is not simply a modern phenomenon. 
It has always been going on. From the very earliest of times. As far back 
as we have recorded memories of Jesus, we have widely disparate 
accounts of his words and deeds. And the events of his life. And the events 
of the lives of those who knew him.155 
This further puts us in a bind: if we are unable to have an accurate portrait of Jesus, can 
we actually imitate him? Does imitation depend on individual reconstruction based on 
pre-existing assumptions about what is admirable? How are we to trust the portraits of 
Jesus if we do not have any actual historical evidence of who he actually was? 
Furthermore, if Jesus is the central figure of Christianity, why are there so many different 
portraits of him? 
Because of these skeptical questions, the same problems found originally can still 
apply. How are we to know what portrayal of Jesus to admire, especially with the 
plurality of portraits? Which portraits of Jesus should we admire? Will we choose a 
portrayal based on some natural faculty of admiration that orients us to the portrait that is 
a fitting object of admiration, or will our choice of portrayal be a matter of cultural 
conditioning and luck? What if we got the ones that were not accurate to him as a person, 
but only were conceived to push the gospel writers' own personal agendas and theological 
readings? This could come back to the Aristotelian problem of circularity, as we do not 
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know what sources to trust, as even the canonical accounts could have just been chosen 
for own personal agendas and not for an accurate representation of Jesus’ character. This 
leads to the cultural problem, in the fact that so many people have wildly different 
viewpoints of Jesus and who he was, even the gospel writers. Jesus’ divinity is focused 
extensively more in the Gospel of John than in any of the synoptic gospels, are we to 
discount the Johannine account because of these discrepancies? Even Luke’s treatment of 
Jesus is different from that in Mark’s account, the former having the Sermon on the 
Mount and the latter having little to say about any ethical teaching. 
Perhaps Jesus is just a malleable figure that we can use to justify our own idea of 
virtue, as this could be a Humean problem. We see certain actions as virtuous, and so we 
latch onto a Jesus that does or approves of those actions. We definitely see this in both 
Aslan’s and O’Reilly’s contemporary accounts of Jesus. Perhaps the gospel and New 
Testament writers did the same thing, using Jesus as a conceived character to justify what 
they deemed themselves to be virtuous and good.  
Finally, perhaps there’s a bit of moral luck involved in this too. What if we do not 
encounter the correct portrait of Jesus, can we then never become virtuous or good? What 
if the portraits of Jesus we have at our disposal are apocryphal, made up, or just plain 
wrong? Even if we admire this portrait, can we actually be imitating the same Jesus an 
Eastern Orthodox monk, or a Franciscan Father, is?  
Although it may seem that Christian ethics has a way out of the problems raised 
in Zagzebski’s theory, it in fact has to deal with the same issues. Although Jesus is a 
central figure that many, still to this day, want to imitate and live like, there are just many 






been a problem since the very beginning of the gospel writing process, and it still is an 
enormous problem today. Without an accurate portrait of Jesus, we may not be able to 
actually practice any sort of Christian ethic or duty. 
7. Conclusion 
How do all of these problems relate to Zagzebski’s theory? As we stated, there 
seems to be a circularity problem within Zagzebski’s theory that Aristotle faces in his 
own ethical theory. In order for someone’s faculty of admiration to be virtuous in the 
sense of being disposed to latch onto fitting objects and the genuinely admirable they first 
need to admire the right person, such that their emotion is shaped accordingly. This is 
because, like all emotions, there seems to be a correct and incorrect way of using them, or 
what Aristotle called an excess, deficiency, and a mean. Emotions have to correctly fit 
their objects to be considered right. However, there needs to be someone to show us how 
to calibrate our emotions and emotional responses correctly. Admiration is the central 
emotion in Zagzebski’s theory, so the same rule applies here. In order for someone to 
know what the right “fit” is in the emotion of admiration, they need to admire the right 
person to show them that. This is the same problem Aristotle faces in his own theory 
when discussing how to become virtuous by finding the virtuous person. 
Second, there seems to be something culturally malleable about our emotions. 
Admiration has definitely been an emotion that can, and has, been corrupted by culture 
before, as we have seen with Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and many other terrible and 
dark times in history. Even today, the battle rages of who is actually admirable, whether it 






cultures can agree who is, and who is not, admirable; is there any chance that admiration 
can lead us to become virtuous people if admiration is this socially impressionable? 
Third, Hume argues that even though reason can dictate who should be admired, 
it will still be the passions that tell us what to do. Although the Nazis can see why their 
admiration of both Hitler and Jesus can be strenuous, passions can still allow one to have 
this sort of cognitive dissonance. This is because reason can never get us to do anything, 
but only give supporting evidence to the passions. Although we may tell people who is 
and who is not admirable, if a certain culture believes them to be so, then they will 
continue to admire them.  
Finally, this may all summate to moral luck. People may just be in the right 
position or the right place to be able to imitate exemplars of moral goodness. Much like 
the Nazi collaborators who could have left Germany in 1929, we cannot be held culpable 
of who are exemplars are or what they did, for better or for worse. This, mixed with the 
cultural malleability of emotions, leads us to not be held accountable for who we imitate 
and admire.  
These problems are not displaced, but exacerbated, in Christianity. The differing 
portraits of Jesus, both canonical and apocryphal, make it all the more difficult to imitate 
an exemplar. This problem exacerbates when one realizes that there are not just multiple 
portraits, but they come from malleable source material. One can merely “create” a 
portrait of Jesus that seems to fit with one’s own moral and ethical codes. How Jesus is 
remembered has been a problem within Christianity since the very start of the religion, 
and it seems that whether it be the gospel writers or news analysts, everyone has a 






Zagzebski assumes that admiration leads us to admire the good, and even though 
it can be culturally impressionable, there is some baseline goodness that will always 
motivate the emotion. Even though we do not know who we should admire, our desire 
and base knowledge of goodness will have us pick out the right person to admire. More 
needs to be said about this base desire of goodness, and that is what the next sections seek 
out to do; to make a case for our desire for goodness that is beyond any sort of cultural 
malleability or dependency. A desire for goodness that allows us to say that one person 
should be admired over another, and a goodness that can guide us through these problems 







AQUINAS, FOOT, AND THE ORIENTATION TO THE GOOD 
 
1. Introduction 
Thomas Aquinas is a medieval philosopher who argues that our rational intellect 
and will, when working properly, orients us to desire the good. For Aquinas, all human 
action is purposive and goal oriented, and the goal of every human being is happiness and 
flourishing. This first part of this section will highlight important details of his 
metaphysics, natural law theory, and virtue ethics to show that human beings are 
naturally oriented towards the good by their reason. The second section will explore the 
problem of vice and a disordered rational intellect. In the last section, I proposed several 
problems to Zagzebski’s moral exemplar theory, and I believe Aquinas’s own answer to 
this difficult problem will be crucial to solving the ones that were discussed in chapter 
two. 
The second part of this section will be to highlight a similar, yet more 
contemporary theory of natural goodness argued by Philippa Foot. Foot proposes a 
version of ethical naturalism, which puts forth the thesis “there are objective, mind-
independent facts and properties… moral naturalists hold that these objective, mind-
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independent moral facts are natural facts.”156 Although and atheist, she drew heavily from 
both Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s virtue ethics. According to Foot, the three essential 
features of virtue are 1) it is a disposition of the will, 2) it is beneficial to its possessor 
and/or others, and 3) it is corrective of some bad human tendency.157 This section will 
give a brief overview of her work in her book, Natural Goodness, and will provide a 
contemporary counterpart to Aquinas’s virtue ethics above. My main reason for having 
Foot in this section is to show that both a theistic and atheistic ethical theory can propose 
that human beings are naturally oriented to the good. 
My hope is that Aquinas and Foot’s theories that human beings are naturally 
oriented to the good can serve as a fundamental basis for the emotion of admiration, 
which is the crux of Zagzebski’s moral theory. The relation between the rational intellect 
and the will is crucial to solving the difficulties brought up in the previous chapter. 
Chapter four will then apply these arguments and show how exemplarism can be 
vindicated in light of the theories and critical discussion that attempts to solve the issues 
in Aquinas’s work. 
2. Aquinas’ Metaphysics 
 Aquinas argued for a hierarchy of being, which is based on Aristotle’s three 
divisions of the soul and his own personal belief in Christian metaphysics. At the top of 
this hierarchy is God, then angels, humans in the middle, then animals, and plants at the 
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bottom. Much like Aristotle, Aquinas claims that we are rational animals, meaning that 
we are the only beings that possess both physical bodies and immaterial intellects. “In the 
hierarchy we bridge the gap between material and immaterial creatures. In an important 
sense, we live in two worlds; the physical world of rocks and trees and the immaterial 
world of the intellect.”158 
Aquinas follows in Aristotle’s distinction between form and matter and divides 
human beings between the material matter and intellectual, immaterial substance. 
Further, all human beings are also members of the same species, as we have the same 
essence of “rational animality,” which comes from the rational form.159 According to 
Aquinas, reason is the highest capacity in the human being, the other two being 
vegetative and sensory powers. Intellective powers are bestowed on humans, angels, and 
God. Although human beings are the best of the sensory animals, we are the lowest 
intellectual creatures. With our intellectual capabilities, human beings can grasp abstract 
concepts like justice and virtue, yet to understand these concepts we require many 
repetitive examples.160 We need our sensory components in order to understand both the 
world around us and these abstract concepts. This is why, according to Aquinas, the body 
is so important; it allows us to observe different examples in order for us to grasp a 
certain concept. Without the body, our intellectual souls would not be able to gather 
knowledge.161 
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Aquinas holds the medieval claim that being is identical to goodness. “Goodness 
and being are really the same, and differ only in idea.”162 This is what is known as the 
Convertibility Thesis, as it holds that “everything is good (1) insofar as it exists and (2) to 
the extent to which it actualizes the capacities unique to a member of its natural kind.”163 
Furthermore, every being desires its own good.  
The Philosopher says (Ethic. i): Goodness is what all desire” …a thing is 
desirable only in so far that it is perfect, for all desire their own perfection. 
But everything is perfect so far as it is actual…Goodness presents the 
aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.164  
All beings desire their perfection and goodness and do actions that aim for or achieve this 
goal. Further, Aquinas states:  
Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is 
in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and 
perfection implies desirability and goodness, as it is clear from A [1]. 
Hence it follows that every being as such is good.165 
The second part of the Convertibility Thesis is a bit more complicated, as existing 
things can be bad, and this relies on an argument through functionality. An example of 
this is that of a knife. A knife’s function is to cut, and if it cuts well, it is a good knife. 
However, if it slices bread poorly, or is not sharp, then it is a bad knife. Furthermore, a 
tree can be a bad tree if it does not produce fruit, and animals can be bad in this sense if 
they are born without hind legs. Aquinas can argue this because things are not good 
simply because they exist, but they must also exist as fully actualized members of their 
species.166  
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No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it 
lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some virtue; 
and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.167  
We will discuss this more in our section over Aquinas’s virtue theory, but a virtue is an 
actualization of a potential inherent in man’s nature as a human. Lacking a virtue is to be 
incomplete—having less being, and therefore less good, than one’s nature disposes us to 
have. We can evaluate something as good or bad in relation to its function: a knife is 
good if it can cut well, an animal is good if it has legs to run and hunt, a tree is good if it 
produces fruit. According to Aquinas, these things are good to the extent that they exist, 
but “they are bad insofar as they fail to actualize the natural capacities that follow directly 
from their essences.”168 
Human beings are no different, as they also have a function and can be evaluated 
as good or bad in relation to carrying out that function. However, the Thomists argue that 
this universal point has a special force for rational agents, as we have a certain amount of 
control over how, or even whether, we actualize our capacities. Much like the examples 
of a fruitless tree and the legless animals, human beings can be bad in a deficient way if 
they lose certain capacities, like hearing or seeing. However, they can also be bad by 
choosing to not actualize certain capacities, like the ones to acquire virtue. “Being moral 
is, for Aquinas, a matter of properly actualizing the capacities we have by nature and can 
control, and free will is what allows us to choose how we are going to actualize and direct 
those capacities.”169 
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Finally, although the human rational soul is joined to the body, it also has 
operations that are “per se” apart from the body. Aquinas holds that 
Now only that which subsists can have an operation “per se.” For nothing 
can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat 
imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, 
that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something 
incorporeal and subsistent.170 
Through our intellect, we can know both corporeal and incorporeal things.171 Through the 
senses, the intellect is able to understand and grasp concepts. Aquinas says further that 
“the body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the 
part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight.”172 
Through the sense data the body gives the intellect, the rational soul transcends the matter 
into abstract thought, which is what Aquinas calls phantasms. This intellective cognition 
is the rational soul’s proper activity, and this is what makes the rational soul independent 
from the body.173 Although the intellect is able to grasp and know certain concepts and 
other forms, it is unable to do so without the senses and therefore needs the body to 
obtain knowledge. Through experiencing particular objects the intellect can abstract 
universal, intelligible concepts.174 
Finally, Aquinas claims that the human soul is unable to be corrupted. Aquinas 
claims that a thing can be corrupted in one of two ways, either in itself or accidentally.175 
To accidentally corrupt something means to add or take away something, and since the 
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rational soul cannot lose or acquire something, it cannot be corrupted in this way.176 
Further, since the rational soul is self-subsistent, it is unable to be corrupted, even when 
the body is corrupted.177 This will be more important as in discussions further, but this 
shows that, although Aquinas holds that the soul needs the body, it is still independent of 
it because the matter cannot corrupt the form. Its proper activity—intellective 
cognition—is also independent, somewhat from it, because the body cannot add or take 
away from its proper activity. The intellect depends on the body to function, not to exist. 
Aquinas’s metaphysics indicates that man is a rational creature that needs its 
physical body to help understand both the natural world and abstract concepts like justice, 
virtue, and goodness. More importantly, Aquinas proposes the Convertibility Thesis, or 
the idea that being is identical with goodness, meaning that the more something actually 
exists, the greater it is. Human beings lie in the middle of the hierarchy of being, as we 
are material beings with the highest degree of being because we have intellects. This 
conjunction allows human beings to perfect themselves through actions which are in line 
with their rational essence. Through reason, we can become fully actualized members of 
our species, which then, in turn, will allow us to achieve our end of becoming happy and 
flourishing people.  
3. Aquinas and the Natural Law 
Aquinas claims that “the good of any thing with a standard and measure consists 
in its conforming to that standard or measure. That is why we say that a thing is well 
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disposed when it has neither more nor less than it ought to.”178 Aquinas has a principle 
called the duplex regula—or the double-sided rule, which is human reason itself and the 
Eternal Law. “Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and 
homogenous, viz. the human reason; and the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, 
which is God’s reason, so to speak.”179 The fundamental rule of the human will is the 
eternal law, which Aquinas calls God’s reason, and rationality is proximate to this law. 
Actions which conform to the eternal law are considered morally good. “The goodness of 
the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human reason: and when 
human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.”180 Further, Aquinas, 
much like Augustine, define sin as an act against the eternal law181 and “the eternal law is 
the standard for distinguishing morally good from sinful actions,” and ultimately “moral 
virtue from vice”182 Austin surmises that “by its participation in the first rule [divine 
reason], human reason is the proximate rule of the human will.”183 
According to Aquinas, the natural law is the human’s participation in the eternal 
law.184 The natural law gives us a natural inclination to provide for oneself and others, 
and gives us the ability to discern good from evil, and Aquinas claims that this is an 
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imprint of God’s light in us.185 This law also allows us to abide by rules and measures 
that promote or prohibit certain actions. We also imitate God’s legislative characteristic 
by dictating the precepts of the law onto ourselves and others.186 For our purposes, this 
section will discuss the importance of the natural law as it relates to the overarching 
argument, which is that the natural law orients us to the good.  
For starters, Aquinas claims that the natural law is a disposition when we 
prescribe it either to our actions or through our practical judgments.187 This includes 
using both the general and universal precepts of the natural law in our own particular 
moral dilemmas and cases. Our reason grasps the universal rules of the natural law and 
applies it to our certain cases. There are universal precepts that everyone knows in both 
theoretical and practical reason. In theoretical knowledge, there are several 
indemonstrable first principles, such as certain a priori truths.188 Aquinas holds that the 
law of non-contradiction is an indemonstrable first principle, not only in theoretical 
reasoning but practical as well. He holds that practical rationality’s version of this law is 
that “we should do and seek good and shun evil.”189 Aquinas holds that everyone 
naturally seeks their own good while avoiding evil.  
Since good has the nature of end, and evil the nature of the contrary, 
reason by nature understands to be good all the things for which human 
beings have a natural inclination, and so to be things to be actively sought, 
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and understands contrary things as evil and to be shunned. Therefore, the 
order of our natural inclinations orders the precepts of the natural law.190 
This quote connects the metaphysical schema described above to his natural law theory, 
human beings are naturally oriented towards the good by their reason, which is guided by 
the natural law. Some examples he gives are things such as self-preservation, familial 
desire, and also the want to live in harmony with other people and know the truths of 
God.191 
Further, Aquinas claims that nearly all virtuous acts belong to the natural law, as 
he states that “everyone has an inclination from one’s nature to act in accord with reason. 
And this is to act virtuously. And so in this regard, all virtuous acts belong to the natural 
law.”192 Because we are rational creatures, as it is our “specific form” according to 
Aquinas, everyone has an inclination to act in accord with reason, which means to act 
virtuously.193 However, there is a small caveat that Aquinas puts at the end of his 
response in the third article. He states, “If we should be speaking about virtuous acts as 
such and such, namely, as we consider them in their own species, then not all virtuous 
acts belong to the natural law.”194 Aquinas’s stipulation is that there are some actions 
which are not dictated by the natural law, but humans have been able to discover through 
the power of their reason that enables them to live righteously. An example here could be 
the moderation of naturally good desires, such as food, drink, and sex. He also hints that 
 
190. Aquinas, “Treatise on Law,” I.II 94.2. 
191. Ibid. 





hitting a personal, self-indexed virtuous mean between the vices of excess and deficiency 
could be seen in this light as well.195 
Aquinas holds that the natural law is the same for all human beings. This is on the 
basis that, since every human being has a similar rational nature that subordinates itself to 
the natural law, the natural law must be the same for everyone. Our similar natures 
incline all human beings to act in accordance with reason and follow the precepts of the 
natural law. However, Aquinas differentiates between general and particular principles, 
as reason advances from the former to the latter.196 Although he maintains that the 
general principles are known and are required to be followed by all rational human 
beings, there seems to be some flexibility in how one moves from the general 
propositions to particular acts. 
[T]he truth or rectitude regarding the general principles of both theoretical 
and practical reason is the same for all persons and known in equal 
measure by all of them…But the truth or rectitude regarding particular 
conclusions of practical reason is neither the same for all persons nor 
known in equal measure even by those for whom it is the same.197 
Continuing on in the fourth article, Aquinas argues that certain dispositions and even 
circumstances allow for docility of how to follow the natural law in particular cases. An 
example for this is the general rule that you should return things you borrow. However, 
on returning a borrowed knife, you find that the person wants to murder somebody with 
it. Since giving back the knife would cause harm to the hypothetical victim, you refrain 
from returning it. Even though you went against a general precept to return things, you 
still followed the natural law in this particular case by doing and seeking good, which, as 
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we have seen, Aquinas holds is the most fundamental principle of the natural law in 
practical rationality. Though the general principles and their applications in particular 
instances will be mostly the same for everyone, there will be exceptions on how one 
follows the natural law in particular actions. 
Aquinas’s final article in Summa I.II.94 is pertinent to our discussion thus far, as 
he discusses whether or not the natural law can be changed, whether it be through certain 
emotions, evil habituation, or an evil natural disposition which perverts the rationality of 
some people, allowing some wicked people to ignore the natural law in particular cases. 
Aquinas uses the example of Germanic tribes that thought stealing was morally 
permissible, which clearly goes against the natural law.198 This example frames the 
question of whether or not the natural law can be excised from the hearts of human 
beings, which Aquinas affirms that it cannot. 
 The main arguments of the article that Aquinas deals with is that sin has the 
ability to excise the natural law from our rationality as it can [1] destroy both the law of 
righteousness (which is the natural law) and [2] the law of grace. Further, and more 
pertinent to the Germanic tribe’s example, [3] humans have done many things contrary to 
the natural law. Aquinas holds to what he has argued earlier, arguing that there are  
very general precepts, precepts everyone knows, and more particular 
secondary precepts, which are like proximate conclusions from first 
principles. Therefore, regarding general principles, the natural law in 
general can in no way be excised from the hearts of human beings.199  
Aquinas is arguing here that nothing, not even the power of sin, can wipe out the 
universal truths our similar rationalities can give us.  
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However, he is not affirming that sin has no effect on reason’s ability to deliberate 
from the natural law. He says further that “the natural law is wiped out regarding 
particular actions insofar as desires or other emotions prevent reason from applying the 
general principles to particular actions, as I have said before.”200 Sin has the power to 
corrupt our ability to apply general principles to particular actions, and even to corrode 
approximations that were made in light of the natural laws general principles, which 
would explain why the Germanic tribes thought that stealing was morally permissible. He 
concludes by saying that “sin wipes out the natural law regarding particulars but not in 
general, except perhaps regarding secondary precepts of the natural law.”201  
Aquinas affirms here something that is pertinent to our conversation regarding 
Zagzebski’s moral theory. Aquinas affirms that, as such, a basic orientation to the good 
and right remains for all people despite the distorting effects of cultural or evil influences. 
In our example in the last section, I used Nazi Germany, and many would use this 
example to claim that sin or evil dispositions could corrupt the rational faculties 
knowledge of the natural law. Moreover, Aquinas already established that actions which 
go against the Eternal Law, the derivative source of the natural law, are sinful acts.202 
Acts which guide us away from our natural inclinations are sinful and vicious acts, and it 
would be a bit arbitrary to say where this corruptive power starts and stops. 
But why would this corruptive power be arbitrary? Aquinas holds that sin could 
be in the reason in one of two ways, either by erring by not knowing the truth, and by 
commanding the lower powers, the appetites, to act against their natural inclinations, 
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thereby having reason fail to put them in check.203 Sin can also disrupt the connection 
between reason and its proper object, which is the knowledge of the truth, and the truth in 
practical matters is the generalized precepts of the natural law which guide our own 
ethical thinking. How, then, could the Nazis still be considered rational if sin or evil 
habituation could fully corrupt their ability to understand the natural law? If what 
Aquinas is saying here is correct, then it would seem that sin could corrupt the rational 
faculty so much that one would not know the precepts of the natural law. How does 
Aquinas get out of this problem? 
Aquinas’s answer to this objection is dated, especially given how different his 
metaphysics is to our own contemporary views on the matter. In the Summa, Aquinas 
claims that sin is handed down generationally, starting with our first parent, which is 
Adam. Since Adam was inclined to sin, all his offspring, humanity, will have the same 
inclination to sin. However, this only corrupts our sensory and vegetative appetites, as the 
rational soul is not transmitted generationally but is given to us by God. Sin primarily 
corrupts the lower parts of the soul “proximately” and only the will “remotely.” Since the 
will, the rational appetite, is part of the rational soul, it cannot be fully corrupted by the 
power of sin.204 
However, Aquinas gives another answer elsewhere, as when he deals with the 
question of whether sin diminishes the good of nature. In I.II Q85 he says that “the good 
of human nature is threefold. First, there are principles of which nature is constituted, and 
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the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul.”205 He continues on by 
saying the other two naturally good parts in our nature are our natural inclination to virtue 
and the gift of original justice. Sin completely destroys the gift of original justice and 
diminishes our inclination to virtue. However, “the first mentioned good of nature is 
neither destroyed or diminished by sin.”206 This first mentioned good is the general 
precept of the natural law.  
Additionally, Aquinas states that “sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact 
that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is 
not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely.”207 This answer to our 
question may be a bit more helpful to our current discussion, as it seems if our rationality 
is completely destroyed by the powers of sin and vice, we would not be rational creatures 
at all. Surely, those who followed the Third Reich were still rational agents capable of 
acting rationally, even if much of what they did under the influence of the Nazi ideology 
was irrational. 
Connecting this back to what Aquinas states about the precepts of the natural law 
and his views on habit could also help us better understand what he means when he says 
that the natural law could not be wiped away from the minds of men. If we remember that 
every human being acts towards their own perceived good, then reason’s ability to follow 
the generalized precept of the natural law could still be said. It could be that their 
perceived good is the good that they are following, even if it is going against their natural 
inclination to virtue. Much like a smoker who no longer cares about the health risks of 
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smoking could still be following the general principle of the natural law by seeking good 
(relief he gets from smoking) and shunning evil (not feeling the relief).  
4. Aquinas on Virtue 
In his ethical theory, Aquinas connects the natural law, the cardinal virtue of 
prudence, and habitual moral virtues together. First, reason knows the general principles 
of the natural law, and through the power of prudence applies these general precepts into 
particular cases. By setting our ends correctly, meaning to act in accordance with 
reason’s legislative powers, we are able to deduce what actions are in accordance with 
reason and those that are not. The moral virtues then control the appetites to desire the 
good and to do good acts. According to Aquinas, every being desires its own perfection, 
and virtue is what enables human beings to obtain their own perfection. Virtue is what 
perfects our capacities, and it is through the rational soul we become virtuous (or vicious) 
people. This section will lay out Aquinas’s account of virtue and how it connects to 
human’s desire for goodness. 
The intellectual virtue, prudence, otherwise known as practical wisdom, aims at 
perfecting our intellectual capacities, which are aimed at truth. Further, it enables human 
beings to make good judgments about what we should do, and this in turn controls and 
empowers the will accordingly do desire things that will contribute to our overall 
goodness and happiness.208  Regarding prudence, Aquinas holds that it is  
a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good 
deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man 
does, but also how does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not 
merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things 
reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the 
due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is 
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suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the 
appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that 
which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed 
a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things 
ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual 
virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitable 
affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. 
Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.209 
Aquinas claims that prudence is one of the most crucial virtues necessary to living a life 
that is oriented with right reason, since it is the virtue that allows us to do good deeds in 
relation to our good ends. Not only that, but it also perfects our reason, which empowers 
us to carry out our function by living in accordance with reason. Although this may seem 
recursive, prudence perfects the rational capacities as they are related to our ultimate end, 
which is to live a flourishing and good life. 
Next, Aquinas discusses the relationship between prudence and the moral virtues. 
In the quote above, there is an obvious connection between practical wisdom and making 
choices that allow one to live a good life, and Aquinas follows Aristotle’s treatment of 
prudence by putting it in close relation with the moral virtues.  
The moral virtues are so called because they are located in or involve the 
appetites—and our moral character concerns the good, which is the object 
of appetite. That is to say, as an intellectual virtue, prudence is aimed at 
the truth, but as a director of the appetite and its movements, prudence is 
aimed at the truth about the good that is to be done, and that good is the 
object of the moral virtues.210 
As was stated above, practical wisdom moves us to the truth, however, it is also the 
conductor of the appetites and its movements. A will that is guided by prudence will aim 
itself as the truth about the good that should be done. As practical wisdom perfects the 
intellect, so moral virtues perfect the appetites, “whose object is the good as loved or 
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desired.”211 This connection goes further though, as Aquinas says one cannot have the 
moral virtues without prudence because “it is a habit of making us choose well.”212 
Since prudence orients our intellect to the good, the prudent agent will desire what 
is good. Our final end, happiness, can only be achieved through a habitual formation of 
desire towards the good that is judged worthy of pursuit by a correctly working rational 
intellect and desired by a correctly ordered rational appetite. A correctly working rational 
intellect will deem that perfecting one’s capacities is a means at achieving one’s 
happiness. A habit that perfects a human being’s capacities, what Aquinas calls a virtue, 
will be considered a good habit, while a bad habit distorts the human’s nature capacities 
and desires for good.213 Virtue is in accordance with our nature, and anything that is 
unsuitable for it is deemed a vicious or evil.214 
Aquinas differentiates a “human act” from an act of a human. Human acts are 
intentional and orient the agent to some end, while an act of a human is just something 
that may be done without a purpose or mechanically, such as winking (a human act) 
versus blinking (act of a human).215 Habits are the principle for a human act, and are acts 
which are “performed in a manner proper to or characteristic of human and proceeding 
from reason and will.”216 As we said, repetitive actions which enable the agent to flourish 
can be evaluated as good habits, while those that lead to destructive tendencies can be 
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deemed as bad. We evaluate agents based on these qualities, as they modify and qualify 
the person who has them.217 
Nicholas Austin identifies four ways in which Aquinas defines a habit, as a habit 
is a “quality or disposition that is stable, operative, valent, and nature-directed.”218 In 
terms of stability, one must possess the quality in order to have it. We would not consider 
someone who, on occasion, gives money to charity, charitable. Someone who actually 
continually gives away money, time or energy to causes will actually be deemed as 
charitable. Repetitive actions develop one’s character virtuously or viciously, depending 
on how they act in accordance with right reason.219  
Next, habits need to be operative, meaning that they are disposed towards acts of 
operations. Going back to Aquinas’s metaphysics, everything is always on the spectrum 
of potentiality and actuality, and habits are neither, as they lie somewhere in the middle. 
“A habit lies midway between potentiality and actualization.”220 Austin compares this to 
a child who is learning to play the piano (potentiality), and after years of playing can play 
it very well and expresses the capacity to do so when the musician sits at a piano to play 
(actualization). It would seem that the skill of playing the piano well remains dormant 
until it is utilized, as is not always in “being.” Aquinas calls a habit a “first actuality” of a 
capacity, in that it begins to perfect a potential, such as the ability to play the piano, while 
“second actuality” of a capacity is the completion of the capacity, meaning a habit is 
“midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.”221 
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Next, habits that are virtuous and vicious are either good or bad, as they are never 
neutral and says that they are  
dispositions whereby someone is disposed well or ill…For when the mode 
is suitable to the thing’s nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is 
unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of 
consideration in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first 
species of quality.222 
This leads into Austin’s last point, which is that habits are nature-directed, which include 
both the valence and operative qualities of habits. Aquinas says, “as we have said above, 
habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing’s nature, and to its operation or end, by 
reason of which a disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto.”223 Being nature-
oriented means that it moves us in a direction either to fulfill our natural capacities or not, 
and more importantly, we can evaluate if these are in fact good or bad habits by how they 
are fulfilling our ultimate ends. Austin sums it up nicely: 
Virtuous habits do not diminish but improve our capacity to act from 
reason and will. A virtue cannot be a modern habit, since the more 
something is done from modern habit the less it is done from reason; it 
must a habitus since virtue, as principle of a human act, is nothing other 
than a perfection of the rational powers of agency.224 
Acting from reason and rationality is the human being’s natural operation and acting 
virtuously perfects this power. By acting and performing good habits we can start to 
become a virtuous agent who maximizes his capacity to exercise his rational powers 
which orient us towards actions that fulfill our natural desire and want to flourish and 
become happy.  
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Aquinas calls virtue both “the perfection of a capacity” and “a habit ordered to 
action.”225 As was seen in the piano example above, virtue starts from a capacity within 
human nature to acquire the virtue, which is then traced in two stages of its actualization. 
First, the natural capacity to acquire the virtue is perfected, and second, the perfected 
capacity issues in virtuous action. By the virtue going through this two-fold process of 
actualization, it is set up as a “pivotal role in the teleological, or actualization-directed, 
picture of human flourishing.”226 
However, if human beings are naturally oriented to the good, why do they 
sometimes go wrong, developing vicious character traits instead of good ones? Just as 
virtue affects both the intellect and the will, so too does vice. As stated above, human 
beings have the ability to develop vicious and sinful dispositions of character, and even 
the ability to pursue lesser goods at the expense greater ones. Why is this the case, 
especially if people have a natural orientation to the good in both their rational intellects 
and wills? In terms of this project, how does someone, like the Nazis, come to admire 
Hitler?  
Vice is the opposite of virtue, but also differentiate between sins; vices are a type 
of disposition or inclination toward what is not suitable for a human being to do, while 
sins are “disordered acts.”227 Vice, much like virtue, is a disposition and a habit, but one 
that disposes us to act badly. Moreover, Aquinas makes note that having a vice is not 
sinful, but when someone commits a bad act because of a vice, then it is a sin. A sin is an 
action that is contrary to right reason, as it opposes actions and dispositions that 
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contribute to the fulfilment of the ultimate end.228 Much like virtue is acquired when we 
the intellect and the will are working properly, so vice is acquired when the rational 
intellect and appetite are disoriented. This disorientation could be in the intellect, the 
passions, or the will. All actions involve the will, even sinful and vicious ones, so in a 
sense, all sinful actions are a result of an improperly oriented will. Our question mainly 
applies to sins and vices that result from an improperly working will, so I will only focus 
on that part of Aquinas’s hamartiology. 
In any of the different types of sins, there seems to be the tension that the will can 
ignore the rational intellect’s deliberation that one good is greater than another. This 
seems pertinent to the question above: how could one admire vicious people at the 
expense of virtuous ones? This has to do with what Aquinas calls sins of the will, one that 
lead the agent into doing acts from “deliberate wrongdoing.”229 Since the will’s basic 
orientation is to desire the good that the properly working intellect judges worthy as 
pursuit, the will is “out of order when it loves more the lesser good [at the expense of the 
greater one].”230 According to Aquinas, we choose evil knowingly, meaning that we 
choose to pursue a lesser good at the expense of a greater one.  
According to Aquinas, every act has some sort of goodness,231so human beings 
will be drawn to do nearly every act. However, some actions are greater than others, such 
as virtuous acts are better than vicious ones. However, an improperly oriented will is not 
choosing evil for its own sake, as this would go against the most fundamental principle of 
 
228. DeYoung, Aquinas’s Ethics, 97.  
229. Ibid, 104.  
230. Aquinas, Summa, I.II 78.1. 
231. Ibid, I.II 18.4. 
 
 82 
the natural law. When the agent chooses a vice, or admires a vicious exemplar, they are 
choosing a lesser good that is judged as greater than an actually better good. This means 
that the agent does not choose evil for its own sake, but rather for the sake of obtaining a 
lesser good. Since humans are always oriented towards the good, they must see some 
good in their desired act. Much like the smoker we discussed earlier, they desire stress 
relief, despite knowing that smoking causes poor health issues. Even though we may do 
something we know is wrong, we see some goodness from it that we hope to obtain.  
The agent who acts from deliberate wrongdoing does so and eventually regards 
the lower goods as a greater good because of habit. This eventually redacts down to sins 
of the intellect. “The origin of the disordered preferences lies in the intellect’s presenting 
disordered alternatives to the will again and again until the disordered preference is 
inculcated within the will; over time, the will acquires a misshapen or disordered 
preference.”232 A habitualization of preferring and choosing a lesser good at the expense 
of a greater one creates a disordered will, which in turn creates a sin done from deliberate 
wrongdoing. 
Yet, the problem redacts to sins of the intellect, and either (1) the will ignores the 
intellect’s actual preference of a greater good and chooses the lesser good or (2) the 
intellect falsely judges a lesser good to be greater, or more worthy of pursuit and desire, 
than a greater one. How does this happen? As I have stated before, this is germane to our 
current discussion in Zagzebski’s moral exemplar theory, and if Aquinas can answer this 
difficult problem, we could apply it to our own vindication of admiration.  
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How does (1) happen, how can the rational appetite ignore the intellect? This is 
even more confusing, as  
The intellect presents to the will as good certain things or actions under 
certain descriptions in particular circumstances, and the will wills them 
because it is an appetite for the good and they are presented to it as good. 
For this reason, the intellect is said to move the will not as an efficient 
cause but as a final cause, because its presenting something as good moves 
the will as an end moves an appetite.233 
It seems here that the will can’t simply ignore the intellect, as the will is moved by the 
intellect. Eleonore Stump defines the will as a “bent or inclination,” incapable of making 
its own judgments towards perceived goods. Therefore, the problem is not a problem 
with the will ignoring the problem, but desiring lesser goods, which is exactly what our 
second problem entails. The implications of this are far more reaching, however, as this 
means that the intellect, which is inclined to goodness, can actually desire vicious or evil 
things. We have seen this hinted at in Aquinas’s account of vice and sin, but the problem 
originates in the intellect.  
However, the will does exercise some degree of efficient causality over the 
intellect, going so far as the ability to adopt or to reject a particular belief. The will can 
also exercise this authority over the intellect by directing it to attend to some things or 
ignore other things, or even to stop thinking about something altogether.234 However, this 
is only on the basis that the intellect judges these things as good, such as to be distracted, 
or to stop thinking about a sad advertisement that wishes you to donate to a charity for 
orphans. The connection between the will and the intellect is extremely close and is 
difficult to see where one stops and the other starts. However, what is most important for 
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this discussion is the notion that the will is an appetite for the good, so there needs to be a 
perceived good that the intellect must desire.  
On Aquinas’s account, the will wills only what the intellect presents at 
that time as good under some description. Acts of the will, then are for 
something apprehended as good at a particular time in particular 
circumstances, as distinct from something which is good considered 
unconditionally or abstractly.235 
Eleonore Stump continues on further:  
If the intellect does present something to the will as good, then, because 
the will is an appetite for the good, the will wills it—unless the will directs 
intellect to reconsider, to direct its attention to something else, or to stop 
considering the matter at hand. The will’s doing this is, of course, a result 
of the intellect’s presenting such actions on the part of the will as good, 
and such an act on the part of the intellect may itself be a result of 
previous acts on the part of the will directing the attention of the 
intellect.236 
The important thing here that Stump points out is that it is the intellect that first must 
perceive something as good for the will to desire after it. The only thing the will can do is 
direct the intellect’s attention to something else, namely, another perceived good. 
However, the intellect will have the final say because it will judge whatever good as the 
one which is to be desired. Of course, this is not just a conversation between the intellect 
and the will, as the passions are also a part of this deliberation process. However, for 
simplicity’s sake, the intellect has the final say in which perceived good is greater than 
another. 
Stump uses the idea of incontinence to stress a very useful point that is relevant to 
our current problem with Zagzebski’s moral theory. In the case of incontinence, the 
intellect represents something as good which the will is not willing.  
 




Aquinas would say that the intellect, influenced by the will, is in fact 
being moved by opposed desires to represent the thing in question as both 
good (under one description) and not good (under a different description), 
so that the intellect is double minded.237  
It would seem that the intellect can become double-minded, as it is not always clear on 
what it desires. However, with the push of the passions, and higher order ends and desires 
in certain circumstances, the intellect may be driven to perceive lower end goods, even 
vicious actions and dispositions, at the expense of greater ones.  
The idea of double mindedness is an important notion when discussing how the 
intellect can become corrupted. “The reason these morally wrong choices can have the 
effect of misprogramming the intellect in both its speculative and practical parts is 
explained by the will’s ability to exercise control over the intellect—in this case, indirect 
but immediate control.”238 As we have seen, the intellect proposes the perceived good (as 
opposed to what really is good) to the will, and this perceived good is what the will 
wants. I could continue writing this paper, or I could stop and watch television. My 
favorite show is about to be on in the next 10 minutes, and I decide that is a better good 
than finishing this paper despite my approaching deadline. The intellect judges watching 
television as the greater good, the will wills it, sets my appropriate end, and then carries 
out steps to complete this end.239 
Although my example may just be a bad or lazy choice on my part, there may be 
other cases, such as sin and viciousness, that this is applied too. How can the intellect 
judge these as worthy things to pursue? First, the intellect must approve of the vicious 
act, as the agent must see something good in the act itself. I may like to watch television 
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to relax or escape the dread of deadlines, but if I come that I judge putting off 
responsibilities a good, then my rational appetite will desire it. This consent to sin and 
viciousness may be an act of the appetitive power, but reason’s approval precedes sinful 
and vicious acts.240 If I do this repeatedly, I will obtain the character trait of sloth and 
laziness, which is not only a vicious character trait but also one of the seven deadly sins. 
The cause of my vicious state of sloth is that there was some apparent good that was (1) 
judged by the intellect and (2) desired by the will, so therefore both the intellect and the 
will play a role in sinning and obtaining a vicious character disposition.241 
Next, the intellect, when questioning whether or not this is an actual good worthy 
of pursuit, it will fall back onto the descriptions of why it was deemed good in the first 
place. The intellect will then command the will to desire and will the perceived good. 
So in a case in which the will wants what in fact is not good, as a result of 
the command of the will the intellect directs its attention to just the 
evidence which supports the goodness of what the will wants and turns 
away from any countervailing evidence.242 
The description of what is good about the perceived good misprograms the intellect to the 
point that it deems lesser good as better than greater actual ones. “The misprogrammed 
intellect allows the will to want as good what it might have rejected before the 
misprogramming of the intellect; and the warped will, in turn, misprograms the intellect 
further.”243 
Aquinas’s explanation above answers our question of how one can choose lesser 
goods at the expense of greater ones. This also has implications for exemplarism, as the 
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same process can come about when choosing a vicious exemplar, albeit a bit more 
complicated. The admirer could be in a state of double-mindedness, seeing both positive 
and negative traits in an individual he may want to admire. Analogous to the case of 
desiring viciousness, the intellect will ultimately decide that the vicious exemplar is 
worthy of admiration. The intellect then judges two things regarding the vicious 
exemplar: (1) the positive traits that the exemplar does have make him worthy of 
admiration and (2) the vicious dispositions he possesses are minimized or outweighed by 
the positive traits the vicious person possesses.244 This will then lead the will to do two 
things (1) adopt or imitate the positive traits that the exemplar has and (2) ignore the 
vicious dispositions or justify them in light of the positive traits. When confronted with 
any countervailing evidence that this exemplar is not worthy of admiration, the admirer 
will fall back on his judgments and will to justify that vicious exemplar as worthy of 
admiration.  
But why is this wrong, not necessarily in terms of the obvious wrong of someone 
admiring Hitler, but in terms of Aquinas, and how does it connect back to Zagzebski’s 
exemplar theory? This connects back to Aquinas’s metaphysical schema that permeates 
his natural law and virtue theory, which all points to the fact that human beings desire 
goodness. However, this is not merely a descriptive account of who we are or how our 
rational intellect and wills work, but a normative theory which claims that these people 
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who are not acting in accordance with reason and the natural law are wrong,245 and 
therefore should not be admired. 
As we saw in Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human nature, a human being’s 
differentia is rational, and a good human being is one who actualizes their capacity for 
rationality.  
[A]nything is naturally inclined to an operation appropriate for it in 
accordance with its form…And so since the rational soul is the proper 
form of a human being, every human being has a natural inclination to act 
in accordance with reason. And this is act in accordance with virtue.246 
In this quote we see Aquinas connect his metaphysics, natural law theory, and virtue 
ethics all in one. All human beings are inclined to act in accordance with reason and 
acquire virtue, so one can say that a good human being is a moral human being. 
Further, Aquinas is not giving us a mere descriptive account of human nature and 
ethics, but a normative one. This is needed for our exemplar theory as well, as we want to 
say who are and are not exemplars. Going back to Aquinas’s metaphysical sketch, a 
human being’s form is the rational soul, and from this soul there are things that are 
known naturally by us all, such as the ability to perfect our capacities through the 
virtues.247 From this we can judge people as virtuous and vicious, and in Zagzebski’s 
terms, worthy of admiration or disapprobation.  
Aquinas claims that evil implies privation, something that is done not in 
accordance with reason. Whereas virtue perfects these the human being’s capacities, vice 
and evil destroy them.248 The human being’s nature gives us a natural desire to perfect 
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our capacities, and it seems that we would judge those who have done this successfully 
by acquiring certain virtues as good people who are worthy to follow, that is, if our 
intellect is working properly. A correctly working intellect will be able to judge that those 
who have only a few redeeming traits, but corroded capacities through vice and evil, are 
not worthy of pursuit.249 
The perfection of our capacities is what every human desires, that is, until the 
judgment of lesser goods disorients our intellects and rational wills. However, moral 
exemplars show us that a virtuous lifestyle is possible, and more importantly, that they 
themselves are worthy of pursuit because they have perfected the human being’s 
capacities, an innate desire that is human to us all. Aquinas claims that the cardinal 
virtues are what perfects the human beings’ capacities, I quote him at length below:  
[W]e find that there are four cardinal virtues. For the formal principle of 
the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which is 
good considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: 
and thus we have one principle virtue, called “Prudence.” Secondly, 
according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into 
operations, and then we have “Justice”; or into passions, and then we need 
two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is 
due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the 
passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a 
curb, which we call “Temperance.” Secondly, by the passions 
withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of 
danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that reason 
dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is “Courage.”250 
Those who embody these virtues are worthy of admiration, and we call them exemplary 
figures that we are able to identify through the emotion of admiration. The emotion of 
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admiration may be the human being’s first detection of the human good that connects 
their basic desire to become virtuous to people who embody what they want to become. 
5. Conclusion on Aquinas 
As we have seen, Aquinas offers a metaphysical schematic which permeates his 
natural law theory and virtue ethics. He begins by claiming that we have a rational soul 
which is able to control both our sensory and rational appetite. He also claims that we 
have a natural inclination to the good, and virtue is that main good that human beings are 
inclined to pursue, as this perfects our rational capacities. The precepts that allow us to 
know what the good is and to follow it comes from the natural law, which is man’s 
derivative participation in God’s Eternal Law. By applying the general principles of the 
natural law, which is to pursue good, or the perfection of our being by becoming virtuous, 
into particular cases. Sin and evil can corrupt us and make us into vicious people, but it 
can never fully corrupt our rational faculty to the point that we will not be able to desire 
goodness or discern the good at the least in some basic form. 
6. Philippa Foot and Natural Goodness 
Although Foot draws from Aristotelian virtue ethics, she differentiates from both 
Aquinas and Aristotle saying that practical rationality should not be seen in a desire-
fulfillment theory, meaning that practical reason should not be used to justify actions that 
one has done to satisfy personal desire. However, much like Aquinas, she sees a close 
connection between practical rationality and the will. Much like Aquinas, Foot also sees 
the relationship between these two, ultimately putting practical rationality as the thing 
that guides the rational appetite (to connect it to a Thomistic framework).251 
 
251. DeYoung, Aquinas’s Ethics, 138-9.   
 
 91 
What I want to stress at this point is that in my account of the relation 
between goodness of choice and practical rationality it is the former that is 
primary. I want to say, badly, that there is no criterion for practical 
rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of the will.252 
What Foot is proposing here is that our conception of practical rationality must be derive 
from the conception of the human good, not the other way around.  
Foot argues that moral reasons, such as telling the truth, helping a friend, or 
keeping a promise, are on equal grounds of justification as self-preservation and the 
“careful and cognizant pursuit of other innocent ends.”253 What Foot means here is that 
moral reasons are not overriding, and, although morality may be something can justify 
and explain actions, it is just one of many considerations people take when explaining an 
action. She writes that “the evaluation of human action depends…on essential features of 
specifically human life.”254 The human will must be assessed by many of these 
considerations, “especially against facts about what humans need…on Foot’s view, then, 
our conception of practical rationality is inevitably tied to what is good for human beings, 
and must answer to facts concerning what is good for human beings as a species.”255  
As stated earlier, Foot proposes a view of ethical naturalism, meaning that moral 
goodness is an aspect of what makes us good as human beings.256 Foot defines natural 
goodness as that “which is attributable only to living things themselves and to their parts, 
characteristics, and operations, [that] is intrinsic or ‘autonomous’ goodness in that it 
depends directly on the relation of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its species.”257 This 
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conception of moral goodness as natural goodness is based off her idea that objective 
features of living things makes them good members of their specific species. She uses the 
example of a tree and explains that a tree is good insofar as its roots are below ground 
and collect water, leading the tree to have green leaves and flourish.258 Much like natural 
kinds, we too can evaluate human beings by how their certain features and capacities are. 
I believe that evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual 
structure with evaluations of characteristics and operations of other living 
things, and can only be understood in these terms. Life will be at the centre 
of my discussion, and the fact that a human action or disposition is good 
of its kind will be taken to be simply a fact about a given feature of a 
certain kind of living thing.259 
Foot argues that our evaluation of these capacities of organisms will be from an objective 
and normative standpoint, meaning that we assess what is normal for that organism to do 
in the backdrop of its species. Much like we make the evaluative assessment that a tree’s 
roots are good or bad depending on their ability to take in water, we will be making a 
normative judgment that the tree is good or bad. If the tree has roots which can take in 
water, it is a good tree, if it has poor roots that cannot take it water, we not only consider 
the tree a bad tree, but also defective. For Foot, there is no difference between evaluative 
and normative judgments. Much like we would connect the judgment that a tree is bad if 
it has bad roots, we would say a human being is bad depending on certain defective 
capacities.260 Foot argues that there are objective features of living things that make them 
good members of their respective species, and human beings are no different. “The norms 
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which determine what makes something a good member of its kind [Foot] calls ‘natural 
norms.’”261 
But what are the human being’s natural capacities that one judges as either good 
or bad? Much like Aristotle and Aquinas, Foot acknowledges that human beings are 
rational animals, which complicates how we describe our own species. One way in which 
everyone evaluates human beings is how well reason and rationality is applied to 
justifying actions.  
Let us start, therefore, with the fact that there is this great difference 
between human beings and even the most intelligent of animals. Human 
beings not only have the power to reason about all sorts of things in a 
speculative way, but also the power to see grounds for acting in one way 
rather than another, they can ask why they should.262 
According to Foot, every living thing possesses some form of agency which require the 
individual to fulfill these “objective norms” that are required for it to live and thrive, and 
human beings are the same way. Much like Aristotle and Aquinas, Foot argues that plants 
and animals do not set goals or ends, they are merely responding to natural inclinations 
towards goods needed for survival, such as food and reproduction. Human beings are 
different, as we can deliberate on what goods one should follow and have valid reason for 
doing so.263 “We are capable of responding to reasons in a distinctively explicit way, 
inasmuch as we act on some understanding of which things are good.”264 We evaluate the 
norms of human beings by how well their reasons are for acting, meaning that we are 
evaluating their natural inclination to act for good ends. 
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But what, exactly, is the objective norms that human beings are judged by? 
According to Foot, it is to reason well and act towards good ends. “Human good must 
indeed be recognized as different from good in the world of plants or animals, where 
good consisted is success in the cycle of development, self-maintenance, and 
reproduction. Human good is sui generis.”265 Human beings are able to act on reason, and 
others are able to assess whether or not the actions was good or bad in light of these 
justifications. Foot uses the example of a man who needs to cash a check to avoid a late 
fee but is bedridden with a fever. Although the man has reasons for doing both actions, 
there is an overriding “should” that comes from his usage of practical rationality, and the 
only rational thing to do is to stay inside and rest.  
For the actions of anyone who does not ᶲ when ᶲ-ing is the only rational 
thing to do are ipso facto defective. It does not matter whether we say that 
he acts irrationally, or rather say ‘acts in a way that is contrary to practical 
rationality.’ In either case it is implied that he does not act well.266 
According to Foot, not using practical rationality, or using it poorly, is a human being’s 
natural defect, much like a root that does not collect water well.  
Human beings have the ability to set goals and ends for themselves and promote 
actions which bring about that goal. If someone’s reason is defective and chooses bad 
ends, or does not do what is rational, then we would say that those are bad ends or actions 
which that person has done. Foot puts this in a naturalistic way, showing that the same 
way we talk about plants and animals is the same way we talk about human beings and 
their capacities. Much like we use the same conceptual basis to judge all trees, plants, and 
animals as good depending on how well their natural capacities work, there are many 
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universal capacities that can be a criterion for human beings, and the ability to reason 
well is one of them. Other criterions include mental capacities, imagination, the ability to 
understand language, and even the five senses. We would judge that a lacking of these 
abilities a “natural defect” which connects the schema that Foot was using earlier when 
discussing animals and plants. Although human beings are more complex and are “freed 
from certain kinds of obedience to nature,”267 we still use the same evaluative process 
and judge these natural capacities to be good, because they are natural and not defective. 
Furthermore 
But how does this relate to virtue? So far, it would seem that Foot, much like 
Aquinas, emphasizes our ability to be rational creatures who can promote good ends and 
do actions that accomplish those ends. Also, like Aquinas, she stresses that we have a 
natural desire to promote our own good, and although this is not a teleological argument 
like one found in Aquinas, it is one of natural inclination, simply as asking “why” 
something would do a certain action, such as a flower moving towards the sunlight. One 
of the main capacities that sets us apart from other animals is our ability to reason, and 
for the sake of her argument, the ability to reason on practical matters. Our ability to 
achieve ends allows us to flourish and go for what we see as good.268 If one of our natural 
capacities is practical rationality, then we need dispositions that can better this capacity in 
order for us to achieve our ends in the best possible way. Foot defines virtue as 
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something that “if someone possesses it, his actions are good; which is to say that he acts 
well. Virtue bring it about that one who has them acts well.”269 Virtue is goodness of the 
will, the ability to act well and do good acts.  
Furthermore, Foot argues that we speak of good people in light of his rational 
will.270 According to Foot, and much like Aquinas above, goodness can come from four 
different principles: (1) the nature of an action itself, (2) the end for which the action is 
done, (3) relation to the agent’s judgment of whether he or she is acting badly or well, 
and (4) circumstance.271 If any one of these principles are suspect, or lacking in sufficient 
reason for being “good,” then the action itself is not good.  
In the absence of any defect it will, however, be said to be good in its 
operation, just as a normal, healthy child will come to have what we call 
good balance, to walk well, to talk well, and to relate well to other 
children.272  
Our ability to reason through choices is natural to us as human beings, and the ability to 
reason actions through this list of criteria will know if it is a good act or not. “Rational 
choice should be seen as an aspect of human goodness, standing at the heart of the virtues 
rather than its own.”273 Virtue enables us to reason and act well, which strengthens our 
natural capacities towards goodness. 
7. Conclusion on Foot 
Foot is a neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalist, which means that rationality is at the 
heart of her views on ethics and moral realism. She equates evaluative judgments with 
normative judgments, meaning that in the same way we would evaluate a tree whose 
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roots cannot gather up water a bad tree, we would say that the tree is defective and should 
not be a model for other trees. We find something wrong with its natural capacity to 
gather water. The same schema works for human beings, despite us being more complex. 
Much like Aquinas, Foot emphasizes our ability to reason and strive for certain goals, 
which in turn lets us deliberate actions to achieve those goals. Our capacity for practical 
rationality is a natural capacity, just like the ability for trees to gather water with their 
roots. If a person’s rational capacity is off, or if they desire poor goals or bad ends, we 
will say that their capacity to reason is defective. Further, this points to Foot’s emphasis 
on a rational will, which is our ability to act well. Our practical rationality bends to this, 
and what is good and natural for human beings is what our will strives towards. Virtue is 
what allows practical reason and the rational will to work in conjunction well with each 
other, and it is no surprise that human beings have a natural desire to become virtuous, 
because that will enable us to fulfill our natural capacity for goodness. To sum it up, our 
desire for goodness can only be fulfilled with the virtues, which can only be obtained 







EXEMPLARISM AND SOLVING THE ISSUES 
 
1. Vindicating Exemplarism 
Although it may seem that the deck is stacked against Zagzebski’s exemplar 
theory, there may be some hope that we can find a basis for her claim that admiration 
cannot be so corrupted or led astray that one is unable to detect and spot virtuous 
exemplars. This section will argue that admiration can be supported and vindicated by the 
conceptual basis that was laid out in both Aquinas’s and Foot’s virtue ethics. My 
argument is that their virtue ethics suppose some base level normativity that is essential 
to our nature. If this is true, then it may seem that we are naturally oriented to the good in 
such a way that when presented with clear, strong, examples of goodness, we recognize it 
and respond to it—we are drawn to it—even if we possess socially conditioned or learned 
dispositions that function to mask or redirect that response. To put another way, cultural 
indoctrination that is contrary to the good is always working against a contrary natural 
impulse in a way that cultural teachings in line with the good are not. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, both Aquinas and Foot argue that we have a natural orientation to the 
good. This groundwork that was laid out in Aquinas’s and Foot’s theory will hopefully 
bolster Zagzebski’s moral theory. Although we have a natural desire for goodness, it 
would only work a natural capacity to recognize goodness when presented with it. 
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My first argument goes as follows: 
I) If we have a natural inclination to goodness, then we have a tool which 
recognizes goodness when one is presented with it. 
II) We have a natural inclination to goodness. 
III) Therefore, we have a tool which recognizes goodness when one is 
presented with it. This tool is the emotion of admiration. 
Admiration may be the first conscious recognition of the good qualities in others 
and is based off our natural orientation to the good. As we saw in Aquinas’s metaethics 
of good, the intellect judges things as good. Stump differentiate between two sorts of 
good here, one of general, natural orientation to good things, and another bent towards 
cognized goods which have been deemed as good on reflective judgment.274 The natural 
appetite to good may bring us to admire certain people with good characteristics, but a 
sustained judgement based on reflective analysis will provide one a rational appetite to 
admire that person, which is exactly what Zagzebski argues for. 
However, we need to distinguish between two things (1) an attraction to what 
seems good to us (2) our discernment of the good. If only (1) is natural to us, then 
Zagzebski’s problem is unresolved. However, the Thomistic framework we have 
discussed suggests that everything that seems good to us really is good in some sense, 
just lesser degrees of good in relation to other goods that we could pursue. We have seen 
how the intellect and the will play a role in choosing lesser goods at the expense of 
greater ones, as the intellect will compartmentalize and justify the lesser good as worthy 
pursuit, and the will desires and pursues it. When confronted with any sort of counter 
evidence, the will can choose to ignore it, but only if the intellect judges that ignoring the 
evidence is good in the first place. Thus, the intellect and the will habitualize choosing a 
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lesser good and justifying the choice on the grounds that the good it does have are worth 
desire and pursuit. 
The example we gave was a smoker who chooses to smoke for the relief they get, 
ignoring the counter evidence that smoking causes serious health problems. However, 
applying this to the emotion of admiration will be more pertinent to Zagzebski’s own 
theory. As the Thomistic metaphysical sketch has shown, every human being has some 
degree of goodness, such as some redeeming qualities or traits. People can perceive these 
traits and admire them, since humans are naturally drawn to admire virtuous dispositions 
and those who exhibit them. However, if this potentially admired subject does also have 
terrible vicious qualities, then there will need to be a discussion between the rational 
intellect and will to decide if this person is worthy of pursuit. The intellect will have the 
final say, since it is the mover of the will and points to the goods that the will will 
ultimately desire. The intellect will judge that this person is worthy of admiration despite 
their character traits, which will either be ignored, justified, or downplayed in light of the 
admirable character traits the person does actually possess. Then, this process becomes 
habitualized in the admiring person’s own faculty of admiration, and thus admiration 
becomes defective. 
Further, our subjective view of the good can go wrong, but only in a certain way: 
a prioritization of the goods. There can be a disconnect between what a person pursues 
and what is genuinely good, but the disconnect is never total. The question that is 
pertinent is whether this disconnect becomes so dispersed and consistently chosen that 
admiration becomes an unreliable starting point for moral reflection. Further, can 
someone’s rational faculties become so bad or defective that they are incapable of 
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responding to admirable exemplars? Zagzebski’s moral theory could handle the 
occasional outlier, but the question is whether the faculty can become so corrupted by 
cultural forces that there can be widespread attachment to non-admirable exemplars with 
no one noticing-or no way to effectively distinguish between a virtuous exemplar and a 
vicious one.  
Aquinas argues that happiness is the good that every human being strives for and 
that every one of their actions points towards. According to Aquinas, one way of 
achieving happiness is through perfecting habits through virtue. Therefore, in order for us 
to become happy, we must become virtuous. Although there may be some disagreement 
on Aquinas’s central claim that happiness is what everyone strives towards with their 
actions, this does not prove that everyone merely strives for some subjective view of 
goodness. Instead, Aquinas focuses on our capacity to reason, which every human being 
is able to do. Our capacity to reason is our greatest tool, as we can use its powers to 
actualize our perfection. Every being desires its own perfection, and human beings are no 
different. As stated above, one way in which we obtain our perfection is through the 
virtues. 
Additionally, I noted that human beings always choose their (perceived good) as 
something to pursue, because they will always see something good in it. Although this 
may be a case for relativistic thinking, Aquinas holds the opposite. He knows that there 
are greater and lesser goods, and people who follow lesser goods usually do it at the 
expense of greater ones. However, this is not normal, and this usually means that there is 
something wrong with the basic orientation of the human being. 275 If our faculty of 
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reason is acting correctly, we will usually pursue the greatest goods possible. Our 
intellect can judge which goods are greater than others, say, the good between eating 
healthy and unhealthily. Since the rational appetite desires one’s own goodness, it works 
with the intellectual capacity to judge whether some goods are worthy objects of pursuit. 
A well-working rational faculty that is cultivating the virtues in pursuit of the good will 
aim at the greater goods, while a faulty rational faculty will seek lesser goods at the 
expense of greater ones. 
Additionally, Aquinas’ natural law theory states that there is a fluidity in our 
rational faculty that depends greatly upon the circumstance. The practical universal 
principle of the natural law is that one is to pursue the good and shun evil. However, this 
will look different in particular circumstances, such as not returning a knife to a friend 
who wants to murder somebody with it.276 Moving from universal to particular acts will 
require some flexibility in one’s practical reasoning, but the main tenant that remains is 
doing good and seeking good. If one’s subjective understanding of good does not match 
up with the universal principle of goodness, then there is a problem with the particular 
instance the agent is in and is therefore committing an act against the universal law and 
not following the natural precepts of practical rationality.  
Foot has a similar answer that is relevant to this question. Foot argues that how 
one pursues is through the rational will which decides whether the perceived goods are 
worthy objects of pursuit. Foot has a more naturalistic approach to virtue ethics as we 
have seen, and accounts for different facets of life to be the judge of whether or not 
actions can be morally justified, such as commitments to either family or religious affairs. 
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Furthermore, Foot’s whole thesis revolves around the idea of an objective good, which is 
something that is good for a species of its kind. Human beings are rational creatures and 
have a rational intellect and will to guide them in moral concerns. Ends that fall in line 
with correctly working intellects and desired by correctly working rational wills will be 
deemed good, while ends and “goods” that are desired by faulty human faculties will be 
deemed as bad or defective. Actions are then judged as good or bad in light of their aimed 
at goals. Again, our evaluative judgments are the same as normative ones, so if we say 
something is bad it follows that it should not be pursued or desired by a correctly working 
rational will. A correctly working rational will is one that is conducive to human 
flourishing, much like a correctly working root is conducive to a flourishing plant or tree.  
The problem of whether a person’s rational faculty can be so corrupted or 
defective that they are incapable or responding to admirable exemplars is a difficult one 
to answer. However, on the Thomistic sketch provided I would have to say no, at least 
not widespread enough that engulfs all of humanity. The closest ruination of the emotion 
of admiration was in Nazi Germany. However, I think a more pertinent example comes in 
the aftermath of Nazi Germany in the Nuremberg Trials, specifically that in the person of 
Franz Stangl, a commandant of the Nazi extermination camps Sobibor and Treblinka. 
Stump uses him as an example of how the intellect and will work together to eventually 
justify and will goods that, at one point, the agent would not have desired or thought of as 
good.277 To put it in a Thomistic framework, Stengl was disgusted at the Nazi’s treatment 
of the prisoners, but desired to stay within ranking and good standing with the officers, so 
he chose to ignore, and eventually justify, the atrocious acts. During his trial and eventual 
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imprisonment, he was so sure that he was doing the right thing that he did not feel shame 
for what he did despite being convicted for participating in crimes against humanity. 
Stump uses this example to showcase how someone’s orientation can become so 
defective that not only does the agent’s intellectual rationality judge goods as proper, but 
he also no longer feels shame for what he does. If we apply this case to our own question 
of whether a person’s admirable faculty can become so corrupted by cultural forces, the 
answer seems to be a resounding yes. 
However, I would argue that this, and Nazi Germany, could be an outlier, a 
horrific and terrible one at that. I say this because we do not see the Nazis or Stangl as 
good or outstanding people to be admired, but something to be exemplified as the purest 
form of evil that human beings can become. The Nazis and Stangl are deplorable people 
in history, and a warning of how awful human beings can become if corrupted. Although 
there are some people who believe that the Third Reich were right in their final solution, 
we see these people as not only defective but morally disgusting and vile. I think our 
current view of Nazis show that the faculty of admiration still works, as we judge the 
Nazis as deplorable. Furthermore, although Stengl was corrupted by his 
compartmentalizing and justification of the atrocious acts, there could be some people 
who expressed remorse for their actions (or inactions) during the Nuremberg trials. Take 
Oscar Schindler for example, someone who eventually felt compassion for the Jewish 
people and rescued over a thousand people from being sent to concentration camps. 
To summarize the first argument, we have a natural inclination to goodness which 
is manifested by the emotion of admiration. A person whose faculty of reason has been 
ruined by evil or natural defectiveness, still pursues what they perceive as good and what 
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really is good in a narrow sense, but they are not pursuing good all things considered. 
This dichotomy shows the kind of error to which humans are susceptible: not complete 
misidentification of the good with the bad but an attraction to lesser goods at the expense 
of greater ones. Our base orientation to the good can only be distorted, it cannot be 
destroyed. The fundamental precept of the natural law “do good and shun evil” is, in a 
sense, embedded into our very form as human beings,278 our very nature orients us not 
only to want the good but to see the good for what it is when we encounter it. Further, 
this dictum may be a standard of judgment of whom to imitate and who to not. Since we 
all begin with a natural inclination to good, we can evaluate and judge who is pursuing 
good in their particular circumstances and who is not. By doing this, we can admire the 
virtuous person who is perfecting his own capacities while feeling vindicated 
disapprobation towards the vicious person who is corroding his own capacities. 
My second argument is the core argument of my entire thesis and goes as follows: 
I) If something exhibits these universalized good characteristics, then since 
we are inclined to good, we will naturally be drawn to those things which 
exhibit the good characteristics. 
II) Virtuous exemplars exhibit these universalized good characteristics, and it 
is through admiration that we detect these people. 
III) Therefore, we have a natural inclination to virtuous exemplars who exhibit 
universal good characteristics that all of us are inclined towards. 
Our inclination towards good enables us to pursue good ends that we deem as 
good under the supposition that it will enable us to actualize our perfection and allow us 
to flourish. The rational appetite, like all appetites, is oriented to the good, and the 
rational intellect decides if certain ends are worthy of pursuit. If something inhibits us to 
cultivate the virtues, which are what allows human beings to flourish, then we will be 
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moved to pursue those things as ends. Putting this in the framework as exemplarism, we 
can see that a virtuous end would be the pursuit of becoming like an exemplar. Moreover, 
using our intellectual capacities, we can deduce if this is a good end or not, in light of 
whether this pursuit will enable us to flourish and perfect ourselves.  
But how do we know what exemplars are worthy of pursuit and which are not? A 
way to frame this in a Thomistic sense is how do we know what good things and objects 
are worthy of pursuit and desire? The answer to the latter will apply to the former. As 
was stated in Aquinas’s metaphysics, natural law theory, and virtue ethics, human beings 
are naturally oriented towards the good. We saw Stump differentiate this from natural 
good in general and particular goods judged by reflexive judgment. Exemplars seem to fit 
both of these goods, as we are naturally drawn to good people in general, and then upon 
reflecting upon people we have admiration for, we judge if they are or are not worthy of 
admiration and imitation. 
An intellect that is working properly, which is one that is guiding the will in 
acquiring virtuous habits which, in turn, will perfect the human capacities of rationality, 
will seek out moral exemplars who are or who have fully perfected the capacities of a 
human being. Aquinas holds that all human beings have the same capacities, since all of 
us fall under the genus of rational animal.279 Further, much like every act has some sort of 
goodness, so too does every human being, not only by extension of their existence but 
also that everyone is a mixture of both bad and good traits. I take this to be based off a 
basic understanding of Aquinas’s Convertibility Thesis.  
 
279. See Aquinas, Summa, I 76.5. 
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However, it should be noted here the Stump argues that being and goodness are 
not correlative to one another, that is, on a 1:1 basis. Further, neither is to be identified 
with any one particular characteristic on which the other intervenes,280 such as calling a 
Nazi good because he, on occasion, shows compassion to his comrades. Stump says 
The small amount of goodness that must supervene on even the mere 
existence of a thing is not enough to call that thing good. In fact, if the 
thing falls too far short of the full actualization of its specifying 
potentiality, it is bad (or evil) considered as an instance of its kind, even 
though there is goodness in it.281 
By this reading of the Convertibility Thesis and applying it to moral exemplarism, it 
seems that one cannot justify their admiration for vicious people, or even people who 
possess some virtuous character traits282 because these positive traits, whatever they may 
be, do goodness does not supervene on only one specific trait. Goodness supervenes on a 
character that has perfected the natural capacities of a human being by being in 
accordance with reason, and since there are obvious flaws in all these questionable 
exemplars, they obviously have not perfected all their rational capacities and therefore 
should not be admired. 
Further, the Convertibility Thesis is the basis for Aquinas’s metaethics, and we 
can use normative judgment to deem people as worthy of admiration. The basis for this 
judgment is our natural capacities of rationality and the desire to perfect these capacities 
and anyone who does not do this, or actively did the opposite, is not worthy of  
 
 
280. Stump, Aquinas, 71-2. 
281. Ibid, 74.  
282. I take some examples to be controversial people in history that were once 
reverenced and respected. See chapter two for a discussion of these people. 
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admiration.283 Stump says: 
On Aquinas’s views, an object a has goodness (to an extent) as an A if and 
only if a has the property of having actualized its specifying potentiality 
(to that extent). In particular, moral goodness supervenes on rationality in 
such a way that if any human being is morally good (to any extent), that 
person has the property of having actualized his or her capacity for reason 
(to that extent); and if any human being has that property (to that extent), 
he or she is morally good (to that extent),284 
Moral exemplars have done this, that is why they are exemplary, and we can easily 
identify them. People like Jesus, Buddha, many of the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 
Saints of Christendom, and others have, to put it in a Thomistic sense, developed traits 
that have actualized their rational capacities to a certain extent and, by doing this, have 
acquired moral goodness. If someone lumped people like Christopher Columbus and 
Andrew Jackson into this same group, we would immediately spot something wrong with 
this list, as they would be outliers, since there were obvious moral flaws that one would 
have to glare over or justify to make sense of why they should be on a list of exemplary 
people. The faculty of admiration, then, does not merely work as a detective tool for 
 
283. Using this Thomistic framework does not mean that we are leaving 
Zagzebski’s moral theory behind and gravitating towards a whole new one. The 
admirability of certain persons is the starting point of moral theory for Zagzebski, but it 
does not follow that our judgments of who is admirable is above critique and, as we have 
seen, without difficulties. Instead, it means that our basic understanding of morality starts 
with admiration, proceeds through analysis of those we admire upon reflection, and 
builds into a more extensive moral theory of what makes these people good based on 
these exemplars, but then can come back and refine specific judgments of admirability. 
As long as the collective human judgments of admirability are not systematically 
corrupted, such a process can effectively identify the failures in our faculty of admiration, 
even though that faculty is the starting point of the process. People like Andrew Jackson 
and Christopher Columbus are good examples of this, as they were once revered in 
American History but no longer receive the same respect and admiration they once had. 
Their vices and atrocities are no longer made in light of their great acts that they did. Our 
collective admiration for them has gone through major critique and identified the failures 
of these once revered figures, even if the starting point was in fact our admiration of them 
in the first place. 
284. Stump, Aquinas, 71. 
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moral goodness that one wants to imitate, but, if working properly, also acts as a filtration 
device against things like vicious character traits that destroy our capacities, we have a 
natural desire to perfect. Admiration not only judges that someone is good enough to 
imitate, but also judges that one does not want to become like someone else.  
Moral exemplars are not always happy, but they do have dispositions and 
characters of the human good. This, in fact, is what connects every moral exemplar; their 
ability to exemplify virtuous character and dispositions that all human beings naturally 
want to pursue. To connect it back to Zagzebski’s theory, this is an inference made based 
on the examination of exemplars, not a condition for qualifying a person as an exemplar. 
This inference may be discovered upon reflection and then sustained in the admirer’s 
lifetime. As my argument suggests, anything which characterizes this good is worthy to 
be pursued as an end, such as the desire to be like an exemplar is worthy of pursuit 
because correctly working rational faculties would say that that is a worthy pursuit. 
Furthermore, correctly working rational wills will desire to be like an exemplar who 
showcases these desired goods, since we naturally want to also have these dispositions of 
character. Anyone who does not want to be like an exemplar, or who does not think that a 
virtuous person is an exemplar, would be an outlier and perceived as incorrect, and could 
actually have a faulty rational faculty of intellect and will. Even people whose exemplars 
are in fact vicious people could in fact have incorrectly working rational faculties as well.  
2. Solving the Problems 
Now that we have a basis for admiration, the natural inclination to goodness and 
virtue that is in our rational faculties, we will take a look at how to potentially solve the 
issues that were brought up in the second chapter. As was mentioned in the second 
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chapter as well, the problems may still be pertinent amongst religious circles, and we 
used Christianity as an example. My hope is that the same answers have the ability to 
solve the same problems that are in the philosophy of religion that I previously brought 
up.  
2.1. Solving the Aristotelian Problem 
The Aristotelian problem was one of circularity, as Aristotle claims that the way 
in which we become virtuous is by hitting a relative mean, a mean “by which the person 
with practical judgment would determine it.”285 The problem arises, however, in knowing 
exactly who the person of practical wisdom is, let alone being able to accurately know 
what a virtue is, and Aristotle runs into deeper problems, as he discusses phronesis as a 
virtue, which has its own self-indexed standard of virtue dependent on the person. It 
would seem that, in order for someone to seek out a practically wise person to learn how 
to cultivate the virtues, they would already need the virtue of phronesis to determine who 
would be a virtuous teacher. Emotions, such as admiration, have a mean between vices of 
excess and deficiency, so it would seem that we need to tailor our emotions to fit their 
objects in a way that a practical person would, since we do not want to admire the wrong 
person. 
Austin highlights this circularity problem in his own discussion between the 
virtues and prudence: “we seem to have a vicious circulatory: prudence is the measure of 
moral virtue, and moral virtue, which consists in right appetite, is the measure of 
prudence.”286 It would seem that prudence and the moral virtues have a mutual 
 
285. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b35.  
286. Austin, Aquinas on Virtue, 51.  
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interdependence on one another, and we have seen this in our discussion over the rational 
appetite and intellect.287 However, prudence needs the moral virtues, I quote Aquinas at 
length below:  
Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral 
virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things 
to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about 
which things actions are. Now right reason demands principles from 
which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular 
cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles, whereby he 
understands that he should do no evil…so, in order that he be rightly 
disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he 
needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as 
it were, to a man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: 
for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because ‘such a 
man is, such does the end seem to him’ (Ethic. Iii, 5). Consequently the 
right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have 
moral virtue.288 
It would seem that the morally virtuous person, someone we would call an exemplar, can 
perceive what ends are worthy to pursue because they are truly good. By pursuing these 
ends he is able to reason well about what actions are needed to accomplish these ends. 
Aquinas seems to address this circularity problem in his own writing, as he says “Reason, 
as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end 
precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of 
prudence.”289 This leads into another circularity problem, one in which the rational 
appetite desires a certain end that is judged by the rational intellect as good. However, the 
rational appetite needs to direct the intellect to the certain end, leading to infinite regress 
of interactions between the will and intellect. What is Aquinas’s solution? Aquinas says 
that  
 
287. Aquinas, Summa, I.II 65.1 ad 3.  
288. Ibid, I.II 58.5.  
289. Ibid, I.II 58.5 ad 1.  
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There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as 
preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded 
by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of 
the will.290 
Every act of willing is preceded by some apprehension done by the intellect, but not all 
apprehension is preceded by an act of the will.291 
Further, Aquinas claims that the moral virtues pre-exist in reason, and through the 
power of prudence applies the universal principles (the moral virtues) to particular 
circumstances in which they are needed. He says: 
Now the good of the human soul is to be in accord with reason…the ends 
of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason...in the practical 
reason, certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such 
are the ends of the moral virtues…about these is prudence, which applies 
universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters.292 
As prudence finds its measure in the right appetite for the end, the end finds its measure 
in reason’s natural inclination to pursue good and shun evil, which is reason’s intuitive 
first principle of the natural law. “Natural reason [is] known by the name of, ‘synderesis’ 
appoints the end to moral virtues.”293  
Although there seems to be a circularity problem, the rational intellect’s natural 
knowledge of the good, otherwise known as Synderesis, is the answer to the Aristotelian 
problem at hand, which is the habit that allows us to understand the general moral first 
principles. This is based on our inclination to our own goodness and connects to the 
fundamental precept of the natural law, which is the one should pursue good and shun 
evil. Our ability to grasp the precepts of the natural law through natural reason, which 
 
290. Aquinas, Summa, I 82 ad 3.  
291. See Stump, Aquinas, 282. 
292. Aquinas, Summa, II.II 47.6.  
293. Ibid, II.II 47.6 ad 1. 
 
 113 
inclines us towards our own good in which we can set ends that our rational appetite 
desires, gets us out of this infinite regress.  
Applying the Thomistic understanding of Synderesis we can solve the circularity 
problem that arises in Zagzebski’s own theory. Admiration may be the human being’s 
first understanding of goodness when one is presented with it, and this could be 
Synderesis applying the fundamental principle of the natural law, as we admire those who 
(1) are good and (2) seek good themselves. By using our natural intuition of the good, we 
can find exemplars who desire good ends that we ourselves would want to desire and 
then take actions that will develop our dispositions and habits to accomplishing those 
ends. This starts with the faculty of admiration, which is, at first, naturally disposed 
towards morally excellent people. 
2.2. Solving the Cultural Problem 
The cultural problem comes down to the idea of an entire culture admiring the 
wrong person by virtue of socialization, such as the Nazi’s admiring Hitler, or people 
admiring historical figures like Christopher Columbus and Andrew Jackson. Zagzebski 
discussed Nazism’s admiration for Hitler in her own work and suggested that one way 
this issue could be solved is that someone could compare Hitler to other people he/she 
admires and would no longer admire Hitler because of the inconsistencies in the 
disposition of admiration.294 Even though there may still be discrepancies in who we 
admire, we do not say that the Nazis are right for admiring Hitler, and we are wrong for 
not doing so. “We trust our dispositions to feel admiration and contempt when they 
 
294. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 47.  
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survive reflection over time, and I think we are right to do so.”295 We then cast into doubt 
about this “mere discrepancy” that Zagzebski calls the Nazi’s admiration for Hitler, 
especially as it roots itself deeper into the worldview of those people who admired Hitler 
and other awful people. 
Although I discussed this problem in terms of Stengl and how the intellect can 
become distorted, maybe a more pertinent question is: why are justified in trusting our 
dispositions to admiration when they survive reflection over time? I argued that 
admiration, which is one of the most basic manifestations of our orientation to the good, 
cannot be completely destroyed. A natural orientation of the person to toward the good, 
one that speaks both a desire for and a recognition of it when it presents itself to us 
clearly cannot be annihilated completely, just distorted or twisted. This justifies the hope 
that sustained reflection on its judgments over time will correct the distortions.  
I think a better and more pertinent question in this section is “why do people 
admire those such as Hitler, Columbus, and Jackson, despite their obvious negativity 
towards other people groups?” From a virtuous, or even neutral, perspective, the ability to 
admire people who are so evil would be something impossible. However, this does not 
discount Zagzebski’s moral theory, but only that sometimes people admire the wrong 
person, they are in fact still admiring the person who exemplifies what they see as good. 
What’s necessary to differentiate here is the admiring someone for who they actually are 
and admiring a person under a false description. Admiring someone for who they are 
could mean to actively reflect on their character and judge what positive and negative 
traits they actually possess, along with whether they are truly virtuous. Admiring 
 
295. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 47. 
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someone under a false description could be justifying or compartmentalizing any 
negative characteristics somebody has, much like Stengl did by ignoring the Nazi’s 
euthanizing practices in camps he was overseeing. Over time, admiring someone under a 
false description justifies any sort of negative attributes while exaggerating their good 
ones. Again, this is based on Aquinas that everyone pursues their own good, and for 
Aquinas that usually means at the expense of a greater good, namely, following an 
actually virtuous exemplar. 
As I have argued, the emotion of admiration is an evaluative tool that gravitates 
one towards its desired object, and in terms of admiring an exemplar upon reflection, it 
evaluates that person as good and motivates one to become like the exemplar. We would 
never admire someone we thought was something evil or bad, but someone that was 
good. Even if one did admire someone who was in fact evil, it would only be in virtue of 
some good quality, or some mischaracterization of the person in terms of good qualities. 
This is similar to Aquinas’s discussion about people who strive after bad goals or ends 
and pick up vicious habits along the way. Furthermore, he claims something similar in his 
discussion over the natural law, in which he argues that an evil person still follows the 
natural law since the general precept to pursue good is still intact, the particular 
application of it is gone, even the ability to proximate the natural law in particular cases. 
If this is the case, usually done through the corruptive faculty of reason, then, in this case, 
the Nazis, would have switched lesser goods for greater ones, as they still saw something 
good about Hitler’s leadership. 
In less bleak cases, such as for people who admire Columbus and Jackson, I think 
you could answer this in the same way. People who generally call these people personal 
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heroes are usually seen as having something wrong with their rational faculty. We would 
say that, although they are important historical figures, their crimes and atrocities against 
minority groups outweigh any positive traits that they may possess. While they could 
have some positive traits, such as leadership capabilities, courage, wisdom, etc. we would 
say there are better people who exemplify these qualities while also not committing the 
same atrocities that these two people did.  
This is what I think Zagzebski means when she says to compare admired people; 
it’s the difference between admiring people like Columbus and Jackson and actually 
admirable people who demonstrate the same virtues, such as Dwight Eisenhower. 
Although we may see some positive traits in people like Columbus and Jackson, there are 
many different people who exemplify the same traits that are more worthy of one’s 
admiration. If someone still wants to hang on to their admiration for either of these two 
historical figures, we, again, would have an inclination that something may be wrong 
with other parts of the human psyche, such as their faculty of admiration is being 
overridden by other affective states. This goes back to our distinction between admiring 
someone as they are and as they have been perceived, and the admiring of both Columbus 
and Jackson speak to that. Perhaps those who admire these figures grew up with a false 
narrative of these people which are tied back to memories of their youth. An attack on 
their perceived heroes could also be an attack on those who saw Columbus and Jackson 
as heroic figures, and admiration for these people can tie into a familial bond. Even if 
these tied in experiences are not a conscious association, it may be what triggers a 
defensive response and has the person double down on their admiration for Columbus 
and Jackson. Although Columbus and Jackson had some traits that could be directed 
 
 117 
towards the human good, their actions and atrocities definitely did not show it, and one 
who inspires to be like them would not lead an exemplary life. One could even reflect 
and ask what they want their own legacy to be like, and I doubt that many would want a 
legacy like Hitler, the Nazis, Columbus, or Jackson. 
2.3. Solving the Humean Problem 
The Humean critique of Zagzebski connects with the previous problem, as he 
states that virtue is by and large a social convention. His virtue theory gives two critiques 
in regard to Zagzebski’s theory: (1) virtue is partially determined by social convention 
and is widely influenced by it; (2) any idea of what is virtuous, and likely to be 
admirable, is determined or influenced by social convention. As we have seen, the answer 
to the cultural problem above gives push back on his second critique, meaning that 
admiration, if it is connected to our natural inclination towards objective good, may be 
able to go beyond social convention.  However, the first one still stands but will be dealt 
with below. 
First, Aquinas holds that everything is good in so far as it exists, including 
actions296 so a human being will be drawn to every act. However, it is our natural desire 
and response to an action perceived goodness which draws us to do it, so the value of the 
virtuous act is outside of the agent. The goodness or badness of the quality is not 
dependent on the perception of the agent, the agent only rationalizes if said characteristic 
is judged worthy of pursuit. The Convertibility Thesis in Aquinas keeps virtue and moral 
acts from merely being a social convention. Through our form of rational animal, we are 
able to naturally be drawn to acts that will perfect our capacities. This is done whether a 
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culture says it is correct or not. Virtue and its value are independent of cultural 
malleability because of our natural inclination to objective good that is manifested 
through virtuous actions. 
Connecting this to exemplarism, then, every human being displays some sort of 
positive characteristic, no one is fully corrupted by sin and vice. However, the descriptive 
nature of “a virtuous person” or a “vicious person” will come with a normative judgment 
of whether perceiver wants to be or not to be like that person. People who are not acting 
in accordance with reason and following the precepts of the natural law are wrong, and 
thus should not be admired. Since all of us know the natural law in our practical reason, 
we can use it as a tool to judge whether people are or are not worthy of admiration. 
Hume’s skepticism of reason’s abilities to motivate the agent in any way is well known, 
but even if he was right, he still supposes that there are natural virtues, and one could say 
that moral exemplars do actions that produce benefits for themselves and the others 
around them. Since we are naturally drawn to our own goodness, we will naturally seek 
to possess the natural virtues as well. 
2.4. Solving the Moral Luck Problem 
One of the most difficult issues in all of moral philosophy is the issues of moral 
luck, and Zagzebski’s moral theory falls prey to it. The problem with Zagzebski’s theory 
in regard to moral luck is that much of our moral development seems outside of our 
control, such as the society we grow up in, or those we are around to admire, such as 
parents and other authoritative figures. Aristotle stresses that it is the right moral 
education that makes all the difference on if someone can become a virtuous person.297 
 
297. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b 8-14.   
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This could apply to Zagzebski’s theory by saying that it may be admiring the right people 
that makes all the difference in becoming a virtuous person or not, but if the people we 
are around is largely outside of our control, how does one reconcile this? What if 
someone grew up in a white supremacist family in a US town and all the role models one 
is presented with are in the local KKK chapter, couldn’t that person’s faculty of 
admiration be systematically shaped by upbringing to latch onto white supremacists as 
exemplars? The intellect would initially judge the KKK members as good and would 
present the desire to be like them to the rational appetite, which would then will to be like 
them, thus creating a cycle that mirrors Stengl’s descent into the justification of crimes 
against humanity. The admirer of the white supremacists develops his understanding of 
morality and virtue in terms of the white supremacists he admires. How does one solve 
this perennial issue? 
My answer to this, just as the others, rests on what Aquinas argues: that we have a 
natural inclination to the good. Even if cultural condition shapes the faculty of admiration 
to latch onto the white supremacist exemplars, the natural goodness orientation could 
lead that person to also latch onto truly good exemplars298—and the reflective 
comparisons between the two exemplars should act as correcting method, as this is what 
Zagzebski proposes in her own theory. In terms of the Thomistic framework I have been 
working with, both the rational will and the intellect desire objective goodness, no matter 
 
298. Although their luck could be so bad that they have no morally good 
exemplars in which to admire. But the faculty of admiration would still be working if 
they were admiring someone who they judge as good. If they were to encounter these 
truly good exemplars later in life, then that could act as a correcting method for their 
exemplar-less society’s influence on their faculty of admiration. Moral luck is a difficult 
problem not only for this theory but many moral theories. 
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how corrupted the faculties become. While the white-supremacist-in-the-making could 
continue judging the others in his community as virtuous and morally good, willing to be 
like them, the will’s natural orientation of the good could point the intellect in the 
direction of another good person he admires, and this could be one of the exemplary 
people that we have mentioned. Here, the intellect could judge the KKK member as 
worse in comparison to the true moral exemplar, and the person would then desire to be 
like the more virtuous person. 
 I assume each of them would say that since it is in our rational faculties that each 
person has, this is unaffected by moral luck in some basic, fundamental way. One could 
still become a virtuous person and seek out good people despite living in vicious 
societies, like the ones Aristotle described. If every human being, whether they are in a 
virtuous society or a vicious one, all have the same dispositions toward the good and a 
rational capacity that enables them to seek out good ends. Although they may choose 
lesser ends for greater ones, they are still held responsible for this.  
In fact, someone who had a rough upbringing that was out of their control is taken 
into consideration when judging their actions and their lives as a whole. We would find it 
a sort of defect, or something to take pity on, someone who did not have a good role 
model or exemplar growing up. Although we would find this person still responsible for 
their character and how they are acting, we find that this is a lamentable lifestyle. The 
base desire for goodness would still be incorruptible by luck, however, as this person 
would still be admiring who they saw as best in their life or striving towards things they 
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perceive as good. Although our temperament, capacities, and inclinations299 may be 
subject to luck, our desire as rational human agents for the good is unaffected by it. In 
any circumstance, someone would always be choosing their own perceived good and 
shunning their perceived evils.  
3. Solving the Problem in Christian Ethics 
These issues all arise in Christian ethics as well, as one cannot sidestep this issue 
just because there is an independent moral exemplar who everyone is called to admire. 
This is because we rely heavily on the canonized narratives of the gospels to tell us who 
Jesus was, and these narratives are diverse and ambiguous enough to allow for alternative 
portraits; we are dependent on their accounts. Further, our own reading of Jesus’ 
character could be suspect to cultural influence, meaning that the way we view him is 
malleable. Even if the same problems are solved in the same way as mentioned above, a 
question could be asked: which portrait is the right one to choose and admire? 
Although more of a question for New Testament scholars dealing with issues of 
authority and the canonization process, the problem can be restated as to why there are 
multiple different portraits, and why these are considered better than the other ones. 
Francis Watson, a New Testament scholar, says that: 
the fourfold canonical gospel is not simply the work of the four individual 
evangelists. It is the (relatively) final resolution of a problem of how to 
stabilize the proliferating mass of oral traditions and written texts that 
claimed to represent the original truth about Jesus. It is an attempt to 
impose order in response to the threat of chaos.300 
 
299. Here, I assume Nagel means what one likes or enjoys, not fundamentally 
desires.  
300. Watson, Francis. “The fourfold gospel” in The Cambridge Companion to 
The Gospels. Edited by Stephen C. Barton (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 35.  
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Although the gospels were written in the first century, they were not composed and 
canonized until the second century.301 By then, there were countless other gospels and 
written literary works about the life of Jesus, many of which we now label apocryphal or 
gnostic. Although I will not give a theory of canonization in this section, I hope that what 
we have discussed can play some role as to why the gospels according to Mark, Matthew, 
Luke and John were chosen instead of the others. 
A bit of context before discussing why they were chosen might be important. The 
gospels were written and told orally in the first century, mainly by people in the Jewish 
milieu. “This clear plurality in the gospel accounts of the life of Jesus is not 
unprecedented from the viewpoint of the canon as a while and development in early 
Judaism.”302 What Stephen C. Barton is emphasizing here is that the plurality of accounts 
was a cornerstone in early Judaism storytelling and recounting of history, and we see this 
in the Old Testament’s historical writings  
This implies something important about the nature of biblical and related 
literature: that its main concern was not to give a single, fixed account of 
the past, but to provide authoritative, scriptural resources to enable Israel 
(and subsequently the Jews) to live from the past in the present with a 
view to the future. For this to be possible, multiple retellings and ongoing 
elaborations of the oral and literary inheritance were essential.303 
The gospel writers come from the same cultural background, and this can be seen in their 
writing style. They were not concerned if their experiences of Jesus matched up with one 
another, but were more concerned that Jesus, a man who impacted each of them in a 
significant way, was able to be known by future generations. 
 
301. Watson, “The fourfold gospel,” 35  
302. Barton, Stephen C. “Many gospels, one Jesus?” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Jesus. Edited by Markus Bockmuehl (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 177.  
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For the present purposes, most biblical scholars agree that the gospel of Mark was 
the earliest gospel, which the writer for the gospel of Matthew then took and expanded on 
it, recanting their own personal experiences of Jesus. Next, Luke expanded on both 
accounts and added his own testament, along with what he saw as the continuation of 
Jesus’s ministry in the first-century church, what we now call the book of Acts.304 This 
shows that transcribing and telling the story of Jesus had the same dynamics that were 
shaped by the Jewish precedence of storytelling.  
The story of Jesus, told and retold, provided authoritative, scriptural 
resources enabling believers in Christ to ‘follow’ him, as the first disciples 
had done, in subsequent generations. The remembrance of Jesus was not a 
way of ‘fixing’ him in the past, but of encountering now, in the present, 
the one who had been with the disciples then.305 
The story of the gospels, as we have seen from their historical and ethical impact, have 
done just clearly that; it has enabled people all across generations and the world to hear 
the story of Jesus and want to be like him. Because of this personal impact he had on 
people, both in the first century and now, it was inevitable that there would be multiple 
expressions of the “revelatory impact he made on those who came to know him before 
and after the resurrections.”306 This impact was personal and affected many people then 
as it does today. Of course, this connects back to what we have said about admiration, as 
someone who exemplifies all the characteristics that we strive for will have this sort of 
impact because humans have a natural tendency to talk about the good people who they 
want to imitate. Because of this impact, “one gospel was not only inevitable but also 
necessary.”307 
 
304. Barton, “Many gospels, one Jesus?,” 174-6.  
305. Ibid, 178.  




Stephen Fowl sums it up nicely, and I think it is worth quoting at length sums up 
nicely what I have been trying to get at: 
What the Gospel of John says about itself might be extended to the entire 
canonical collection: ‘Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of 
the disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written that 
you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that 
believing you may have life in his name (Jn 20:30-1). According to this 
statement, what is written in the fourfold canonical gospel is not intended 
to be comprehensive; it would take an infinite number of books to do full 
justice to everything that Jesus did and said and was (cf. Jn 21:25). 
Nevertheless, what is written within the canonical limit is sufficient for its 
purpose, which is not to satisfy curiosity but to engender life by 
representing Jesus in his identity as the Christ. Further books might be 
written, but they are not needed. The one thing that is needful is to be 
found only within the canonical limit. 
Obviously, the gospel writers, both within the New Testament canon and outside of it, 
admire Jesus and judge him as someone worthy to tell stories of and write about. 
However, perhaps reflecting on and comparing portraits and writings of Jesus set the 
canonical limit, like what Zagzebski proposes we do when deciding on which exemplar is 
better and more worthy to imitate. The reason why there is a canonical limit is that these 
four books exemplify his goodness better than any of the other apocryphal and gnostic 
gospels. Although these four were canonized nearly a hundred years later, their examples 
of Jesus’ goodness and its ability to bring people to faith in him as their Lord and savior 
(and thus, exemplar) may be better and more appropriate than the other gospels that were 
written at the time. If the gospels were chosen only for their moral content, to make 
people better by wanting to imitate Jesus, then I would say that they have successfully 
achieved their goal, despite not all Christians having lived admirable lives themselves. 
But how could that be? Christianity has inspired countless people to live admirable lives, 
such as the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox saints, or the letter writers that Foot discussed 
in her own book. The lives of Jesus himself, the saints, and others who profess to imitate 
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Jesus have inspired many people of different nationalities, religions, and cultural 
backgrounds. Jesus’ recorded life and ministry have inspired people to try and make the 
world a better place, and although there may be a plurality of portraits, they only confirm 
that he was an admirable person worthy to be imitated. 
But what about those portraits that we deem as canonical, or those views of Jesus 
that are twisted and distorted for one’s own personal gain? I think the emotion of 
admiration and evaluation will work the same here as it does when we meet non-
exemplary people. There will be those who admire such portraits of Jesus, as there are 
those who admire Hitler. But such admiration will be in tension with the full palette of 
admired people and may not survive honest reflection. Portraits of Jesus that do not fit in 
with our natural grasp for good will fall by the wayside, or they may not agree with our 
moral intuition. That could be one reason why the church authority chose to canonize the 
four gospels rather than the others; they were the best showcase of Jesus’s admirable 
qualities. 
4. Conclusion 
Here, I have attempted to argue that our natural inclination to goodness is the 
fundamental basis for the emotion of admiration. Admiration lets us naturally detect 
those who exemplify virtues that we ourselves want. Both Aquinas and Foot argue for 
this natural desire for goodness and virtue, and admiration seems to be the emotion that 
points us in this direction. I have then attempted to answer the questions and problems 
that were brought up in chapter two, in hopes that I can answer them from the standpoint 
of natural goodness. Finally, we have taken this approach to a problem in Christian 
ethics, but I think that the same answers can be applied to this field. My hope is that our 
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inclination to good will allow us to admire the right people, and while admiration does go 
astray, it is still working because those people are going after what they perceive as good 
qualities. However, rational people would say that this is not the norm, meaning that 









In my introduction, I ended it by asking why this project is important to me. Not 
only did it bring together many of my philosophical interests, but it also helped me 
answer the fundamental question that drove the whole project: how do we become good 
people? What drives us to seek and imitate exemplars, a phenomenon that has been 
integral in human history and society since their conceptions? Is it possible for there to be 
some objective right and wrong that is emulated, commanded, and adhered to those we 
call moral exemplar, and if so, what is it? This project, although philosophically 
important not only to myself but others (I hope), was also personal in trying to answer 
these deeper questions that drove me to pursue an answer in Zagzebski’s moral theory. I 
can say that without a doubt many of these questions have been answered, but many more 
remain; ones that will hopefully lead into future projects and research, but it is good to 
have a fundamental basis and framework which to work from. 
This project started by working our way through Zagzebski’s moral theory. Her 
decision to base the theory around the people that are admired upon reflection and the 
emotion of admiration gives it a simplistic, yet intuitive framework that is accessible to 
those philosophically versed and those who are not. Admiring an exemplar leads one to 
imitating them, and this is, in turn, leads one to becoming virtuous. Zagzebski argues that 
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there are two ways in which we can deem things as good, either in a sense of admiring 
them or desiring them.308 Since admiration is at the center of her theory, she hopes that it 
can “derive the good in the sense of the desirable from the good in the sense of the 
admirable.”309  
Despite the simplicity and accessibility in Zagzebski’s proposed theory, the 
project was spearheaded by the question of whether the faculty of admiration could be an 
actually reliable source that one could put trust in to point to morally good people? While 
one reflects on those they admire, maybe upright religious leaders, great leaders of 
morally good social changes, or those who inspired them to live a better life, one cannot 
help but see times in human history when the faculty of admiration has gone astray, such 
as in Nazi’s admiration for Adolf Hitler. This is where the tension arose: could the 
emotion of admiration be vindicated as a goodness detector despite instances where it has 
been corrupted.  
The corruptibility of admiration was the thesis’s main problem, but not the only 
issue that casts the emotion of admiration into doubt. We considered a perennial problem 
in Aristotle’s virtue theory and applied it to Zagzebski’s own theory. The Aristotelian 
issue was one of circularity; one uses the cultivated virtue of phronesis to detect a 
virtuous person that will teach that person to become virtuous. In order for someone to 
know what the right “fit” is in the emotion of admiration one must admire the right 
person to show them how to correctly fit an emotion to its object.  
 
308. Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, 30.  
309. Ibid, 31.  
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The problem further persists in Hume, who argues that virtue is largely a social 
convention, and if someone is a moral exemplar that is supposed to be admired for certain 
reasons, and if reason (1) cannot generate moral vigor and (2) virtue is a social 
convention, then admiration will only be able to detect those who their culture deems 
virtuous. There is no universalizing admiration if the Humean problem persists. Finally, 
the last problem is one of moral luck. What if someone was raised in a culture or society 
of racist, vicious people? This would have to have some effect on the malleable 
properties of the emotion of admiration, right? Could we really blame someone for 
admiring a KKK member if that’s all they grew up around? On what basis or grounds 
could we say, then, that there is objectivity in identifying exemplars if the emotion is so 
pliable to cultural forces? 
Our answer, and eventual vindication, came in Saint Thomas Aquinas’s 
metaphysical sketch and ethical theory. His moral anthropology proposes that humanity 
is naturally oriented toward the good, and that everything is good in virtue that it exists. 
This is based off his Convertibility Thesis, a medieval doctrine which holds that being is 
identical with goodness. All creatures desire to maximize their capacities, and human 
beings are no different. We are rational creatures, and we desire to perfect our rational 
capacities, thus obtaining goodness through this perfection. The way we acquire our 
perfection is through virtuous habits, which perfect our capacities. 
However, this mere sketch does not solve the issues above since one could still 
perceive vices as virtues and ignore true virtues. Yet, Aquinas argues that not only do we 
have a base inclination to pursue what we perceive as good, we also know what is good. 
Aquinas is a natural law theorist, and the fundamental principle of the natural law is to 
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“pursue good and shun evil.”310 This fundamental principle is known by all rational 
creatures, so there is a sense in which we know what the objective good is, despite our 
independent and subjective views of it. Aquinas holds that all moral virtues belong to the 
natural law, and by cultivating them we are following the natural law. Thus, this 
completes the idea all human beings, no matter how corrupted their faculties become, 
know that cultivating moral virtues is an objective good. 
A problem still persists, why don’t people do this if it known by all? For Aquinas, 
this is a problem with the orientation of the rational intellect and the rational appetite. 
Both of these have a natural orientation to the good, the intellect judges what is good, and 
the rational will wills that good to be pursued. The intellect can go wrong in its judgment, 
and sometimes even be guided by the will to choose another, sometimes lesser, good. 
Further, since everything has some goodness attached to it in virtue that it exists, human 
beings will be attracted to do any act. The intellect can thus judge between two acts, one 
virtuous and one vicious, and if he deems the vicious one as greater than the virtuous one, 
the intellect will direct the will do that vicious act. Through the process of habitualizing 
this act and constantly choosing it over the objective virtue, someone can thus create a 
disordered, vicious intellect and will. The will can also have the intellect ignore certain 
deficiencies in their chosen good, or the intellect can justify and compartmentalize the 
vicious acts good. Whatever it may be, the faculties of the intellect and the will can so be 
corrupted that one can lose their natural orientation to objective and virtuous good. 
So how does this apply to admiration, and more importantly, how does it 
vindicate it? For one, a Thomistic view supposes that no one can be so corrupted that 
 
310. Aquinas, “Treatise on Law,” I.II 94.4. 
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their orientation to the objective good can be totally severed. Although someone has a 
disoriented intellect and will, it may still be working properly since that person is 
pursuing what they perceive and judge as good, just not what actually is good. One is 
always oriented towards virtues, and by extension for moral exemplarism, virtuous 
exemplars, because the connection to the objective good, the perfection of rational 
capacities, is embedded into our very form and nature as a human being. 
Although there may be times in history when it seemed like there were times 
when the emotion of admiration went awry and failed its job, in the grand scheme of 
things, it did not. Not many people admire Hitler or Stalin any longer, and if they do, we 
think that there is something wrong in their orientation as a human being. Aquinas’s 
virtue theory ground a base level normativity where we not only are drawn to goodness 
(desire), but we judge if it is worthy to be desired (admiration). If virtue is an objective 
good to be pursued, and both Aquinas and Foot agree it is, then it should be pursued.  
Aquinas’s metaphysics and virtue ethics vindicate admiration on this normative 
basis, and admiration may be the first, fundamental capacity by which human beings can 
recognize and desire goodness. Admiration leads one to not only judge something as 
good and worthy of imitation (if it is an exemplar) but drives the person to imitate the 
judged exemplar. If we have a base understanding of the good by way of the natural law, 
then one will be able to recognize moral exemplars no matter how corrupted the faculty 
gets.  
So how did this project answer those fundamental questions? We become good 
people by virtue of our natural inclination to become good people. This is not enough, 
however, as to use a trite expression, “no man is an island.” If we are naturally inclined to 
 
 132 
the good, we will be naturally drawn by those who exhibit virtuous capacities. These 
people not only show us how to be virtuous, but that it is possible to perfect our 
capacities (to put it in a Thomistic sketch). We become good people by surrounding 
ourselves with good people and imitating who they were and what they did. This 
inclination to the objective and virtuous good is also what drives the emotion of 
admiration to recognize exemplary good people. The traits we desire will be exemplified 
in the people we admire. If we surround ourselves with great people who strive to make 
themselves better, we will do so too.  
 Is it possible for there to be some objective right and wrong that is emulated, 
commanded, and adhered to those we call moral exemplar, and if so, what is it? 
My final question raises an answer in the grounding problem of philosophy, and 
whether or not morality can be objectively grounded. How does exemplarism on the basis 
of a Thomistic ethical and metaphysical theory, ground the good? As stated, natural facts 
are moral facts, and what is good is embedded into our nature. Our flourishing and 
happiness are what usually grounds this in virtue theory, but those words have become so 
convoluted and have diverged into something subjectively principled; both suffer from 
semantic satiation. However, perhaps exemplarism can become the new grounds in which 
to ground objective goodness in. Perhaps what one achieves when one is virtuous is not 
happiness or flourishing, but the ability to be exemplary. I think this would be a much 
better word to ground human good in, because, as Zagzebski points out, it makes intuitive 
sense. Many people argue if happiness if necessary or sufficient for virtue, but I do think 
that being exemplary is necessary for virtue. This is grounded in the Thomistic and Foot 
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naturalism that was sketched out in the third chapter, and I do not have sufficient (or 
necessary) space to develop it here. That will be for another project. 
Finally, Zagzebski does mention that exemplarism may give rise to new answers 
in the grounding problem, and I gave a brief overview of how it could as well, but what 
are some other avenues of research that exemplarism could produce? Many metaethical 
issues remain, and exemplarism could explore, and perhaps answer, some of these 
perennial problems.311 Some other areas I would like to apply exemplarism in philosophy 
of religion and seeing what virtues or character traits all great religious leaders have. My 
hypothesis is that there would be overlapping traits which are found in all religions, 
which could lead to a better understanding of what moral virtues human beings are 
naturally drawn to. This could lead into a Kantian framework of religious thinking, one in 
which morality is the basis of all religions, and these fundamental virtues are exemplified 
through religious exemplars that we are inclined to admire. I think these are interesting 
avenues of research that exemplarism could find new perspectives in. However, these 
avenues are beyond the scope of my thesis, so I will not develop them here. Whatever the 
avenues may be, exemplarism offers an interesting perspective that can shed new light on 
old questions, thus is the nature of philosophy.  
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